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Radical Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics:
Antitrust and Public Policy Implications
Stephen E Ross*
Univeisities opemting major iterollegiate athletic programs ar heading for if not
already in, a cnsis. Corruption continues to affect major football and basketballprogrnis,
exacerbatedby a failureof imaginationand wil in ideniymg and deternig corruption,and by
a lack of consensus on what constitutes "corruption" when football and men t basketballstats
generate millions ofdollarsbut cannotenjoy a lifestyle commensurate with many peerstudents.
Curaent levels of spending am nonsustainable at many schools. Even where intercollegiate
athletic programs am sustained pninanly by football and basketball revenues, otherwise
visionary and questioningcollege presidentshave yet to publicly question why these revenues
should subsidize nonrvenue spots at the expense of fimanciallypressed classromactivities.
Contraryto the NCAA Constitution, major footballprogramsdo not operate '"in keeping with
prudentmanagement andfiscal pratices." This Essay sets forth an agenda for refor, explains
why the agenda refilects sound public policy and analyzes why and how the NCAA can
implement the agenda in a manner consistent with the Sherman AntitrustAct. It builds upon
four foundationalpmnciples: (1) prudently managed self-sustaiigintervollegnate sports am
legitimate; (2) ntercollegiatesportsprogramsthat arenot self-sustaininghave no greaterclaim
on the surplusproceeds from the activities of othersportsprognns on campus than any other
educationalprogmm offered by the univeisity; (3) the equal opportunitypurposesthat underlie
Title IX should be maintained-and (4) whatever the additionalsocietalbenefits that may result
from DivisionInorevenue sports, they do notjustify the cost ofoperatingthose sports, having
regardfor the societalbenefits thatcan be achievedby operatingthese sports at the equivalentof
an elite club or Division XT level Applying these foundationalpnnciples in light of the
problems facing intercollegiateathletics, this Essay offers a five-part Charter of Reform for
intercollegiate athletics (I) end subsidies for men§ sports at the Division I level; (2) opeate
sufficient women t Division I sports to provide female students with sports opportunitiesequal
to male students; (ilZ)offer othersports on an equal basis to male and female students,1imitedto
financial aid only for financial need or academic merit independent of athletic ability with
significantrestrictionson coachigand travel; (I) allow all scholarshpsto be partial or lull
and reduce football scholarship totals to fify-five; and (V)permit up to one and one-half
scholarshipsfor the most elite athletes.
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Universities operating major intercollegiate athletic programs are
heading for, if not already in, a crisis. Putting to the side the still-tobe-ascertained causes of the horrendous child sex abuse scandal at
Pennsylvania State University (Penn State),' corruption continues to
affect major football and basketball programs, exacerbated by a
failure of imagination and will in identifying and deterring corruption,
and by a lack of consensus on what constitutes "corruption" when
football and men's basketball stars generate millions of dollars but
cannot enjoy a lifestyle commensurate with many peer students.
Current levels of spending are nonsustainable at many schools.' Even
1.
See, eg., L. Jon Wertheim & David Epstein, This Is Penn State, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 21, 2011, at 40. This Essay's focus is on economic and commercial issues
related to college sports. The ongoing scandal at Penn State has too many uncertain facts,
and as a Penn State professor, I may be too close to the issue to analyze it meaningfully as
part of this Essay. The issue is treated briefly hfia note 16 and accompanying text.
2.
See, eg., William C. Rhoden, Biggest Hypocnsy Money Can Buy, N.Y TIMES,
June 3, 2011, at B16 (identifying the Ohio State football scandal where players sold
memorabilia for money); Pete Thamel, Suspected Point-ShaingScheme Shows Gambling
Remains PersistentIssue, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 13, 2011, at B 16 (highlighting the point-shaving
scandal at University of San Diego).
3.
See, e.g., Leon Stafford, An Ams Race' in College Sports: University
AdmiistratorsSay Athletics Spendhng Levels Need Overhaul,ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 13,
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where intercollegiate athletic programs are sustained primarily by
football and basketball revenues, otherwise visionary and inquisitive
college presidents have yet to question publicly why these revenues
should subsidize nonrevenue sports at the expense of financially
pressed classroom activities. Contrary to the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) Constitution, major football programs
do not operate "in keeping with prudent management and fiscal
practices";' neither the NCAA nor the leading conferences take
meaningful steps to avoid the sort of destructive competition that
wastes money without improving the quality of the product for fans or
the "opportunities for athletics competition as an integral part of a
quality educational experience" for student-athletes.'
Countless stakeholders are victimized by unfair aspects of the
status quo. Primarily, these are ordinary students and faculty facing
budgetary constraints exacerbated by the subsidization of
unsupportable athletic programs. In addition, students, alumni, and
athletes suffer when favored teams are penalized for NCAA rules
violations for which they had no role; would-be student-athletes might
have greater opportunities for athletic competition at a level below
Division I, but for wasteful spending on existing programs; and star
players are economically exploited by current rules. Yet there are no
possible reforms that do justice to these stakeholders without severely
and adversely affecting other stakeholders who currently benefit from
the existing unfair structure. Radical reform inevitably entails winners
and losers, and losers will surely resist their existing positions of
privilege.
This Essay sets forth an agenda for reform, explains why the
agenda reflects sound public policy, and analyzes why and how the
NCAA can implement the agenda in a manner consistent with the
Sherman Antitrust Act.6 It builds upon four foundational principles:

2010, at Cl (finding that university presidents think current spending levels
unsustainable because of the need to divert more financial resources to
competitive).
NCAA CONsT. art. 2.16 (2011).
4.
Id.
5.
6.
15 US.C § 1 (2006). The proposal's compliance with Title
§§ 1681-88, is detailed in Stephen E Ross, Radical Reform of Intercollegiate
IX Implications (unpublished manuscript), and summarized in note 42 Azain.

on athletics are
keep programs

IX, 20 U.S.C.
Athletics: Title
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Principle #1: Continued sponsorship of prudently managed,
self-sustaining intercollegiate sports is a legitimate way for
American colleges and universities to enrich the cultural
experience of their faculty, students, alumni, and
surrounding community.
Principle #2: Intercollegiate sports programs that are not selfsustaining have no greater claim on the surplus proceeds
from the activities of other sports programs on campus than
any other educational program offered by the university.
Principle #3: The equal opportunity purposes that underlie
Title IX should be maintained.
Principle #4: Whatever the additional societal benefits that
may result from Division I nonrevenue sports, they do not
justify the cost of operating those sports, having regard for
the societal benefits that can be achieved by operating these
sports at the equivalent of an elite club or Division III level.
Applying these foundational principles in light of the problems
facing intercollegiate athletics, this Essay offers a five-part Charter of
Reform for intercollegiate athletics:
Article I: Using newly created uniform accounting principles,
NCAA member schools cannot sponsor any men's Division I
sports unless their revenues from that sport match or exceed
expenses.
Article II: Schools must operate sufficient women's Division I
sports to provide female students with sports opportunities equal
to male students.
Article III: NCAA member schools can offer other "elite club"
sports on an equal basis to male and female students, limited to
financial aid only for financial need or academic merit
independent of athletic ability, with significant restrictions on
coaching and travel.
Article IV: All Division I sports scholarships may be allocated
on an equivalency basis--each sport is allocated a designated
number of full scholarship equivalents, which may be awarded to
student-athletes as full or partial scholarships; the designated
number for football is reduced from eighty-five to fifty-five.
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Article V: Individual awards can range from one-quarter of the
full cost of education to a sum including a full scholarship plus a
cash subsidy to elite athletes, not to exceed one-half of the
average full cost of education at Division I universities;
compliance would be facilitated by strict auditing of top players,
NCAA adoption of standard law enforcement techniques, and
stiff penalties for all violators.
The case for this Charter of Reform proceeds as follows. Part II
reviews the foundational principles and justifies them as the basis for
reforming intercollegiate athletics. Part III details the five articles in
the Charter of Reform. Part IV explains why the NCAA's adoption of
the proposed Charter would not violate the antitrust laws.
II.

FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES

The final product of any reform proposal, whether adopted by the
NCAA, the major college football conferences, or mandated by
government, is likely to reflect a host of compromises necessary to
secure the requisite political consensus.! There is academic value in
more basic work that seeks to develop proposals anchored in
foundational principles that can be independently justified. The five
specific aspects of the Charter of Reform set forth in this Essay are
based on four discrete underlying principles: (1) self-sustaining
athletic programs enrich American culture and should be maintained,
(2) subsidies for money-losing athletic programs have no inherent
priority claim on surplus profits from other athletic programs, (3) Title
IX principles should be maintained, and (4) cost-benefit analysis does
not justify continued support for Division I sports that are not selfsustaining. This Part considers each of these foundational principles in
turn.
Pnnciple#1: Continued sponsorship of prudently manageg selfsustaing intercollegiate sports is a legitimate way for American
colleges and universities to emich the cultural experience of their
facufty students,alumm, andsurroundingcommunity.

For an example of a reform proposal explicitly suggesting a necessary
7.
compromise, see Matthew J. Mitten et al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized
IntercollegiateAthletics, 47 SAN DiEGO L. REv 779 (2010), which proposes that the NCAA
be granted an antitrust exemption in return for adopting a host of desired reforms.
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College programs that are economically self-sustaining, primarily
football and men's basketball, provide significant benefits to society."
They enrich the cultural experience of university life for many faculty,
students, alumni, and the regional community. These contests
entertain millions.! Particularly where universities are located in
smaller college towns, popular contests provide a substantial boost for
the local economy, bringing in fans who would otherwise not be
visiting the community to patronize local hotels, restaurants, and
stores." Sports programs provide an opportunity to unify the campus
community." Moreover, if prudently managed, many major programs
can be operated commercially to generate significant surplus revenues.
These funds can then be used to improve other university programs. 2
By definition, self-sustaining intercollegiate sports do not impose
any economic costs on colleges or universities. Given the significant
benefits, sound policy would disfavor these programs only if they
imposed noneconomic costs. In this regard, some critics claim that
these programs harm the educational experience at most major
universities." To be sure, there are specific examples of significant
noneconomic costs-as in the cancellation of Friday classes following

Steve Berkowitz & Jodi Upton, Money Flows to College Sports, USA TODAY,
8.
June 16,2011, atAl (finding from an NCAA report that in 2009-10, athletics programs at 22
of the 218 Division I public schools generated enough money from media rights contracts,
ticket sales, donations and other sources (not including allocated revenue from institutional or
government support or student fees) to cover their expenses).
9.
See sources cited infra note 59.
10. With regard to claims that taxpayers should subsidize professional sports stadia
because of the substantial boost to the local economy, economists generally agree that these
benefits are vastly overstated because entertainment expenditures in major metropolitan areas
are not likely to be affected by the presence of a professional football team. See generlly
SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). Different
considerations arise for college teams in remote locations.
11.
See Eric Simons, The Pice of Excellence- Can CalAfford Athletics?, CAL.
MAG., Spring 2010, availableathttp://alumni.berkeley.edu/news/California-magazine/spring2010-searchlight-gray-areas/price-excellence.
12. Under this proposal, significant surpluses from the University of Alabama's
football team could be reallocated to teaching and research; if paying Nick Saban millions of
dollars is a prudent way to realize these surpluses, Alabama should do so. See John D.
Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, andCollege Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109, 121.
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. DOWLING, CONFESSIONS OF A SPOILSPORT: MY LIFE AND
HARD TIMES FIGHTING SPORTS CORRUPTION AT AN OLD EASTERN UNIVERSITY (2007);
MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION (2000); Christopher M. Parent, PersonalFouls: How Sexual
Assault by Football Players is Exposing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 617, 622 n.29 (2003) (citing SPERBER, supr, at 60-61,

claiming that athletic success raises admissions applicants but also college's "party
atmosphere," which may be detrimental to education).
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televised Thursday night football games. 4 Although there is also some
evidence that a change in the profile of students at elite, selective
liberal arts colleges resulting from the admission of significant
numbers of underqualified and uninterested athletes had an impact on
the education of the remaining student body," it is not clear that these
findings apply to the large universities that dominate Division I
intercollegiate athletics."
The benefits outlined above, weighed against the minimal costs,
justify continued maintenance of these programs. Note that this costbenefit analysis does not include additional justifications that are
sometimes offered in support of intercollegiate athletics. This Essay
does not claim that major programs ought to be maintained for the
As detailed in Principle #4, the
benefit of student-athletes.
noneconomic benefits to student-athletes can be achieved at a far
lower cost. Nor does society need colleges and universities to match
highly profitable professional leagues with eager would-be
professionals seeking training-these stakeholders can easily find
other ways to obtain desired commercial results. Nor does this Essay
make the claim that universities benefit by increased donations and
other financial or noneconomic support because of intercollegiate
athletics. Studies have not been able to support this anecdotally
supported claim" with statistically significant empirical evidence."
14. See, eg., Mark Viera, At Virginia Tech, Thursday Night Games Create a
Commotion, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/10/28/AR2009102804529.html (discussing the pressure Virginia Tech administration places on faculty to cancel afternoon classes for a weekday football game in order to
clear parking lots).
15.
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME:
SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 70-79 (2003).

COLLEGE

16. Early analysis of the Penn State scandal is that the commercial success of college
football led senior administrators to cover up sexual abuse, allowing a predator to prey on
young boys. See Wertheim & Epstein, supnr note 1. It is too soon to tell whether this
explanation for the administrative malfeasance is accurate and whether it is particularly
linked to big-time college athletics, or whether it might be present in any large institution
(would the University of California or MIT hush up a scandal involving a Nobel Prize
winning professor attracting eight-figure research grants?).
17. Many university development officials will, of course, claim that it is easy to
develop relations with prospective donors while celebrating a victory. Professor Michael
Oriard, a noted observer of college sports-see, for example, MICHAEL ORIARD, BOWLED
OVER: BIG-TIME COLLEGE FOOTBALL FROM THE SIXTIES To THE BCS ERA (2009)-suggested

in a guest lecture to my class that profiles of institutions like his own-Oregon State
University-were higher due to its higher-profile membership in the Pac-10 Conference than
schools that might otherwise be considered peer institutions, such as Colorado State
University. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 136-41
(2011) and Mitten et al., supi note 7, at 793-98 document further anecdotal "success
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Of course, where the commercial demand for football and
basketball does not generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses,
those sports would not be the only culturally enriching activities to
receive subsidies from general university funds and student fees.
University student affairs budgets often subsidize lectures, dramatic
performances, and musical entertainment for the benefit of students
and faculty. These subsidies are rarely controversial and seem to
reflect a consensus within the university community that the entire
community receives good value for money from the relatively modest
cost of hosting these events. So it is theoretically possible that, among
the 51 (of 120) Division I schools where football expenses exceeded
revenues in 2010, many presidents and trustees may have reached a
similar cost-benefit calculus."
This theoretical possibility does not counsel, however, against the
general principle that the use of funds otherwise available to a
university's general educational needs should not be used to subsidize
Division I intercollegiate athletics. As has been demonstrated, there
are too many schools pursuing "investments" in football success.2
Why do presidents and trustees divert scarce funds from educational
programs into football? There are several logical possibilities. One is
that reports of financial losses are mere accounting tricks, and almost
all Division I football programs actually make money. (If this is
correct, then these programs will not be affected by the Charter of
Reform.) A second explanation is that these officials systematically
overestimate the likelihood that their "investment" will actually result
in the sort of substantial benefits to an institution of higher learning
that would warrant diverting funds from greater classroom instruction,
to use one example. Finally, senior administrators and trustees may
succumb to special-interest pressure by influential alumni, students,
and the public, who wish to "consume" the entertainment value of bigtime sports at their local university, even though enough consumers do
stories," although they do not purport to empirically demonstrate that investment in athletic
success is prudent, nor do they analyze other anecdotes of less successful "investments."
18. Joe Drape & Katie Thomas, AsAthletic Directors Compete, Big Money Flows to
All Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at Al (discussing how economists have found it
difficult to quantify a link between investing in a high-profile athletic program and reaping
presumed benefits, like alumni donations or higher application rates).
19.
DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004-2010:
NCAA
DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT, 28 tbl.3.6 (2011), available at

http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/20 ORevExp.pdf.
20. See, eg., DOWLING, supm note 13. Professor Fulks's study, FULKS, supra note 19,
at 28 tbl.3.6, found that fifty-one schools "invested" an average of $2.8 million on moneylosing football programs. That is a considerable amount of bad investment.
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not share their desires to support the activity commercially. These selfinterested consumers use their influence, under the pretext of greater
social benefit, to force less avid football fans among the students and
faculty into accepting fewer teaching assistants and faculty, and higher
student fees, to subsidize their personal tastes for an entertainment
service that the market will not provide.2' As political officials
correctly begin to turn away from the log rolling process of specialinterest earmarking,22 likewise colleges and universities ought to reject
the diversion of resources from the education of the many to the
entertainment of an insufficient few.
Pinciple#2 Intercollegiate sports programs that are not selfsustahnng have no greater clahn on the surplus proceeds from the
activities of other sports programs on campus than any other
educationalprogram offered by the university.
Few major colleges and universities operate on an "independent
profit center" basis, where each academic or administrative unit
presumptively is allowed to spend all revenues generated by its own
operations." Yet, where successful football and basketball programs
do generate surpluses, the common practice is for the university
administration to allow these funds to be spent at the discretion of the
athletic director on nonrevenue sports.2
21.
There is a more economically sophisticated policy argument justifying
maintenance of money-losing football programs: that, in economic terms, fans derive
significant "utility" from the existence of teams that cannot be commercially exploited by the
university. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 17, at 90-93. Two responses suffice to render this
claim unpersuasive. First, this argument is limitless in a predominantly free market economy,
where one can always argue that some reallocation of nonessential goods or services would
advance utility. Second, as the principal reform advocated here is to bar a subsidy of athletics
from education, it requires the assumption that a big time supporter of State U football who
enjoys watching games on his couch without paying for it derives greater utility from this
endeavor than a State U history student would derive from having a teaching assistant to lead
a discussion section for a large American History course.
22. See, e.g., The President's Weekly Address, 2010 DAILY COMp. PRES. Doc. 978
(Nov. 13, 2010) (stressing the need to eliminate wasteful earmarks and add transparency to
earmarks); Earmark Transparency Act of 2010, H.R. 5258, 11Ith Cong. (2010); Earmark
Transparency Act, S.3335, 1 I th Cong. (2010).
23.
RONALD EHRENBERG, CORNELL HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE SURVEY
OF THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION METHODOLOGIES EMPLOYED AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESEARCH AND DOCTORAL UNIVERSITIES 2 (2000), available at http://www.ilr.comell.edu/

cheri/surveys/upload/cherisurveyl999.03.pdf (finding that 63% of surveyed private
institutions and 92% of surveyed public institutions did not use independent profit center
methods).

24.

Steve Wieberg, NCAA President: Tne To Discuss Players Getting Sliver of

Revenue Pie, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:48:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/

college/mensbasketball/2011-03-29-ncaa-pay-for-play-final-fourN.htm

("The spigot of TV
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In part, this policy is required by NCAA rules mandating that
members wishing to participate in Division I football and basketball
offer a minimum of fourteen sports at the Division I level. 25 However,
many major programs sponsor far more than the legally required
minima.
There is no evidence that maintaining successful Division I
nonrevenue sports programs materially aids commercially profitable
football and men's basketball programs. Any university decision to
spend these surplus funds on nonrevenue sports-whether from
taxpayers, student fees, university endowment funds, or commercial
profits-reflects a policy judgment that funding the lacrosse and golf
teams is a better use of these funds than funding additional teaching
assistants for the history department. As detailed in Principle #4, that
policy judgment is unpersuasive.
Principle#3: The equal opportunitypurposes that underlie Title IX
should be maintained
One public policy argument that independently justifies the use
of university funds (either surplus from commercially profitable
football and/or men's basketball, or other university sources) to
subsidize sports programs at the Division I level, even though they are
not economically self-sustaining, is the pursuit of equal educational
opportunity for men and women.
Demand by women and girls to participate in interscholastic and
intercollegiate sports has grown exponentially since Title IX's
enactment in 1972. Empirical evidence strongly supports the public
benefits to increased athletic participation among girls and women.27
and other revenue is open only for football and basketball, and often must subsidize at least a
dozen more men's and women's sports.").
25. NCAA BYLAWS art. 20.9.4 (2011). Although beyond the scope of this Essay, in
addition to being unsound policy for reasons articulated under this Principle, this Bylaw is
also vulnerable to an antitrust challenge if it could be shown to be imposed for commercial
reasons (such as to prevent lower-revenue schools from competing more effectively with their
wealthier rivals because of the need to invest in other sports).
26. Ohio State sponsors thirty-seven sports. Ohio State Buckeyes Official Athletic
Site, OHIOSTATE BUCKEYES, http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com (mouse over "sports") (last
visited Feb. 26, 2012). Michigan sponsors twenty-seven. Univemity of Michigan Athletics
Varsity Sports, MGOBLUE.COM, http://www.mgoblue.com/school-bio/mich-varsity-sports.
html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). At financially strapped UCLA, twenty-two sports are
sponsored. 2010-11 Season in Review, UCLABRUINs, http://www.uclabruins.com/genrel/
2010-1 1-year-in-review.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
27. Betsey Stevenson, Beyond the Classroom: Using Title IX To Measure the Return
to Hgh School Sports 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15728, 2010),
available at http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/betseys/papers/TitlelX.pdf ("Many studies have
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The social benefits of subsidizing women's sports extends beyond fans
and student-athletes because of the strong evidence that Title IX has
had a transformative effect on the opportunities for girls and women to
participate in sports.28
Principle#4: Whatever the additonal societal benefits that are
achieved by maintaihgcurrent fundhg for Division I nonrevenue
sports, they do not justify the costs, having regard for the societal
benefits that can be achieved by operating those sports at the
equivalentofan elite club or DivisionIIlevel.
As noted, self-sustaining, prudently managed programs provide
substantial benefits and impose few costs. In contrast, programs that
are not economically self-sufficient impose significant economic costs
on universities. The fifty-one Division I-A schools whose football
expenses exceeded revenues reported a median revenue loss of
$2,868,000.29
In analyzing the benefits of Division I nonrevenue sports, policy
makers must consider the experience of the hundreds of thousands of
student-athletes who participate in intercollegiate sports at the club and
Division Ill level at American universities.30 These programs (elite
club sports at Division I schools and all sports at Division III schools)
are distinguished from Division I programs in a number of ways: they
generally do not provide athletic-based financial aid (students remain
eligible for merit scholarships offered without regard to athletic ability
and need-based aid); while coaching is important, it is restricted; and
teams generally play within a smaller geographic region to minimize
travel." The direct benefits of club and Division III intercollegiate
documented a positive relationship between participation in high school athletics and
educational aspirations, educational attainment, and wages later in life.").
28. Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title LMk Sex-Based
ProportionalityRequirement for College VarsityAthletic PositionsDefensible?, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 731, 731 (2003).
29. FULKS, supranote 19, at 28 tbl.3.6.
30. Bill Pennington, RapidRise of College Club Teams Creates a Whole New Level
of Success, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2008, at BI 1 (estimating that two million college students
play competitive club sports); DENISE M. DEHASS, NCAA, 1981-82-2007-08 NCAA
SPORTS SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION RATES REPORT 63-64 (2009), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/PR2009.pdf (reporting 163,211 students participating in Division 3 athletics during the 2007-2008 academic year).
31.
Seven SCAC Schools To Form New DIfZ Conference, NCAA (June 8, 2011),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/20 11/June/Se
ven+SCAC+schools+to+form+new+DIII+conference (explaining that seven Division III
schools are leaving the Southern Collegiate Athletic Conference to form a new conference in
order to be more regional, because that will reduce travels costs and missed classes);
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athletics almost exclusively accrue to the participating student-athletes:
fitness, teamwork, dedication to competition, rewards for success, etc.
In short, these sports fulfill the NCAA's ideal that athletic participation
should primarily be for the "physical, mental, and social benefits"
derived by the athletes. 2
To be sure, there are some indirect beneficiaries. Parents, family,
and friends can share in the pride of athletic accomplishment of
student-athletes. These club and Division III sports, however, do not
benefit spectators, the campus community, or the local economy in the
same way that commercially successful sports do. To the extent that
colleges and universities attract academically desirable students to their
institution on the strength of the number and quality of intercollegiate
opportunities, they would be free to continue to offer academic-merit
scholarships to these student-athletes who could continue to participate
in intercollegiate athletics at a level equivalent to elite clubs or
Division III.
Nonrevenue Division I sports provide a wonderful opportunity
for elite student-athletes to compete against each other and derive the
physical, mental, and social benefits of intercollegiate athletics
participation. They provide indirect benefits to parents, family, and
friends to share in the pride of athletic success. In some cases, alumni
who formerly played the sport remain close to and follow the
successes of their alma mater. However, when the social benefits of
nonrevenue Division I sports are compared to club and Division III
sports, it becomes difficult to conclude that continued subsidization of
these sports is warranted as a matter of public policy. To use my home
university as an illustration, the Penn State Nittany Lions woman's
Division I soccer team has an annual budget of almost $500,000," not
counting the internal transfer of funds to cover the equivalent of
fourteen full athletic scholarships, a total value exceeding $475,000.34
Undeigaduate Scholarships,NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcmI/connect/public/NCAA/
Academics/Undergraduate+Scholarships (last updated Jan. 31, 2012) (stating that Division
III member schools do not offer athletic scholarships); see also Tarik El-Bashir, TCU Is
Heading to Big Eas4 WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at Dl (discussing how Texas Christian
University's (TCU) decision to join the Big East athletic conference will require member
schools to travel almost 1400 miles for certain athletic matches, but will give TCU a chance
at an automatic BCS bid).
32. NCAA CONST. art. 2.9 (2011).
33. 2009-10 Operating Expenditures, PENN ST. U. BuDGET OFF., http://www.
budget.psu.edulopenbudget/budgetdetail.asp?type=A&FY=20092010&AdminArea=066&Fu
ndtype=03&dept-0668662400&budget-N (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
34. NCAA BYLAws art 15.5.3.1.2 (2011) (listing the maximum value of financial aid
that an institution may provide in an academic year to women's soccer is the equivalent of
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The budget for four well-funded club sports-men's and women's
rugby and ice hockey-is $326,211.3
Unless, contrary to the claim set forth in Principle #2, varsity
soccer has some privileged claim to the surplus profits from football,
the question for those administering public policy in the university
setting (university administrators and trustees) is whether students in
large lecture classes ought to have additional teaching assistants, or
whether student-athletes who lack financial need and do not qualify
for academic scholarships ought to have athletic scholarships, multiple
coaches, and travel widely across the nation or region. When
compared to the "physical, mental, and social benefits" that their club
sports colleagues obtain-despite no scholarships, limited coaching,
and regional travel-this seems hard to justify.
III. THE CHARTER OF REFORM
The foundational principles set forth in Part II lead to a sensible,
principled, and workable Charter of Reform, which will save
universities millions of dollars by eliminating athletics expenditures
that are not cost-effective, diverting these savings to educational
programs. To summarize, the Charter would terminate Division I
men's "nonrevenue" sports, limit Division I women's sports to those
necessary to match the heavily reduced men's offerings, while offering
a more equitable and market-based allocation of reduced nonneed
athletic scholarships available in major sports. It would also allow
those athletes whose efforts contribute significantly to campus
revenues to share modestly in these riches, while sharpening
enforcement against under-the-table payments. This Part provides the
details for such a charter.
Article I Usng newly created uniform accounting pnnciples,
NCAA member schools cannot sponsor any men &Division I sports
unless theirrevenues from that sportmatch expenses.
This proposal would bar NCAA member schools from operating
a men's sport on the Division I level unless sport-specific revenues
fourteen scholarships). The value of a Penn State scholarship was estimated in Jay Paterno,
Pay Student-Athletes? They'r Aheady Getting a Great Deal, STATECOLLEGE.COM (June 2,
2011 5:52 AM), http://www.statecollege.com/news/columns/jay-paterno-pay-studentathletestheyre-already-getting-a-great-deal-766175/.
35. 2010-11 Operating Budge4 PENN ST. U. BUDGET OFF., http://www.budget.
psu.edu/OpenBudget/budgetdetail.asp?type=B&FY=2010201 1&AdminArea=027&Fundtyp
e=01&dept-0271897800&budget-N (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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matched expenses, because "nonrevenue" sports are not cost-justified.
The precise impact on football and basketball would depend on
important decisions that NCAA implementing legislation would
address in creating a system of uniform "generally accepted
intercollegiate athletics accounting principles" (GAIAAP).
As
tentatively outlined here, almost all Division I football and basketball
programs might be considered self-sustaining from revenues. It is
likely that only a fraction of current men's sports programs in other
sports would be sustainable. As with current collegiate ice hockey,
these programs could continue at those few schools where revenues
match expenses, most likely with sports-specific conferences.
The requirement that sport-specific revenues meet expenses can
be achieved by a wide variety of revenue sources. The key is that the
university received the funds either in return for goods or services
directly related to the school's sponsorship of the specific sport or from
donations expressly conditioned on expenditure for that sport. This
ensures that universities discontinue the current subsidization of men's
sports from surplus football or basketball profits or from funds that
would otherwise be available for general educational purposes.
Commercial revenue streams include any money that a university
receives in return for selling something. Currently, major athletic
programs receive millions of dollars in revenue in return for allowing
fans to view sporting entertainment (live, in the form of live gate, and
at home or in sports taverns, in the form of television and streaming
video). Thus, revenues from tickets, "donations" required as a
condition of securing prime seats, luxury suite/box rentals, and sale of
broadcast rights all would be included. Game-day events often attract
ancillary profits to the university from concessions, parking, and the
like. University logos associated with athletic teams often attract hefty
license fees by those seeking to manufacture and sell licensed
merchandise." In addition, corporate sponsors make commercial
decisions to advertise to college sports fans and to tap into the loyalty
of alumni, students, and the public for well-regarded universities; they
are granted access to this audience in return for substantial sums.
These too could be included as sport-specific revenues.
Sport-specific donations from outside sources also would be
counted in determining whether a sport was self-sustaining. This
could include commercial "donations": for example, the Big Ten
36. Where merchandise is not sport-specific, GAIAAP would have to devise a
formula to allocate licensing revenue to specific sports.
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Conference presidents might decide, both for football and academic
reasons, to preserve Division I competition for all twelve members and
use revenue sharing to boost the income of less commerciallysuccessful programs. Professional sports leagues who have been freeriding on college sports could provide their own subsidy: for example,
Major League Baseball (MLB) could provide funds sufficient to allow
a core of Sunbelt teams to continue to offer Division I baseball. If the
national governing boards of Olympic sports (such as swimming,
gymnastics, or track and field) believed that an elite intercollegiate
athletic competition would be a useful way for them to spend their
developmental funds (note, however, that no other Olympic power
does it this way), they could award grants to applicant schools to
enable them to continue to offer the sport at the Division I level.
True donations from individuals or foundations would also count.
Indeed, a refusal to subsidize specific men's nonrevenue sports has
directly led to generous donations by alumni and supports of major
university athletic programs. For example, Penn State would not
upgrade facilities or expenses for a Division I men's ice hockey team
unless funds made the program self-supporting; a generous alumnus
(who shortly thereafter purchased the Buffalo Sabres) donated over
$80,000,000 to create an endowment to start such a program.37 With
regard to program maintenance, the California Golden Bears baseball
team was marked for elimination, but the Chancellor reversed the
decision after $10,000,000 in donations was raised."
The principal accounting issues that will determine whether or
not a program is self-sustaining fall on the expense side of the ledger.
There is a wide variance in the treatment of expenses, in particular two
major items. First, universities have built expensive facilities for their
athletic teams, either financed internally or through debt. Once built,
athletic programs might or might not be charged an imputed rent or
charged for debt service. Second, universities vary in how their
budgets reflect athletic scholarships. Some university accounting
schemes charge the athletic program the full costs of a scholarship and
internally transfer funds from athletic revenues to the general fund."
37.
Pat Borzi, Reshuffling Blurs Picture,JeopardirmgConferences,N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2011, at SP8 (discussing Terry Pegula's $88 million dollar donation to Penn State
primarily to finance an arena that would allow Penn State's men's and women's hockey teams
to compete at the varsity level).
Steve Yanda, Not YourAverage Comeback,WASH. PosT, June 18, 2011, at D3.
38.
39. See, e.g., Understanding Tuition, U. MICH. (Aug. 2011), http://vpcomm.umich.
edu/pa/key/understandingtuition.html (stating that the Athletics Department pays for
scholarships for student-athletes).
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Other universities may not count scholarships as real expenses. In
adopting GAIAAP, the NCAA should have regard for the current
fiscal crisis in higher education and assure prudent management going
forward.
This suggests that sunk costs incurred prior to the
implementation of the Charter-such as debt service on existing
facilities-should not count as expenses for purposes of article I.
Because the purpose of article I is to force universities to decide
whether to maintain or eliminate Division I men's sports based on
fiscal prudency, expenses that the university remains liable to pay
regardless of that decision should not affect the decision.
Different considerations affect the treatment of athletic
scholarships. Most Division I universities do not operate under strict
capacity limits for their undergraduate student body. If Division I
programs were discontinued, student-athletes receiving scholarships
would not likely be replaced by nonathlete students paying full tuition
at these schools. Thus, an accounting scheme that counts the cost of
tuition (likely to be many multiples of the actual marginal cost of
educating a single student) is already providing an effective subsidy for
the university's general funds. Under this view, tuition would not
count as an expense. Out-of-pocket expenses related to an athletic
scholarship, such as food, books, room (if off campus or in a campus
dormitory that would otherwise have been occupied by a full fee
paying student), and the like, would count as expenses.
The concept of prudent management does not require any
commercial operation to break even each and every year. The goals of
the Charter of Reform would be disserved if a university was required
to discontinue a program whenever unanticipated decreases in
revenues or increases in expenditures caused a generally sustainable
program to incur a temporary deficit. Likewise, schools should have
the freedom to make prudent investments designed to be recouped
through increased revenues in the medium term (three to five years).
Drawing on the principles of Financial Fair Play adopted by European
soccer's regulatory body, the requirement that sports be self-sustaining
should be measured over a period of three years.40 In addition, a
wholly independent group of financial and business experts should be
able to grant limited and special waivers to programs in extraordinary
circumstances where even a three-year deficit is likely to be corrected.
40.
AND

UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATIONS (UEFA), UEFA CLUB LICENSING
FIR PLAY REGULATIONS art. 59 (2010), available at http://www.uefa.com/

FINANCIAL

MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/clublicensing/01/50/09/12/1500912_DOWNLOAD.pdf.
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As explained in Principle #1, the risk of capture by special
interests justifies the policy that bars the university from diverting
funds otherwise available to other educational programs to subsidize
the athletic program. This bright-line policy is warranted even though
there are some universities for whom a modest subsidy generates
sufficient benefits to the university's profile to render the expenditure a
prudent investment. To the extent that the special-interest capture fear
is exaggerated, an alternative would permit a university's board of
trustees to avoid the force of article I, using a special procedure to
minimize the risk of capture. Under this alternative, every three years
a university's athletic officials would have to place on the public record
an estimate, followed by a detailed account of their revenues and
expenses, of the precise sum of the internal university "investment"
required to maintain a sport at the Division I level. Next, the
university's deans and directors of other educational and service units
would prepare and publicly provide to the trustees a specific list of
nonathletic programs that could be funded with the money saved by
eliminating the athletic subsidy.4 Then, for a period not to exceed
three years, the trustees could openly vote to forgo the educational
alternatives proposed, in favor of continuing the athletic "investment."
Article If Schools must opemte sufficient women &Division I sports
to provide female students with sports opportunities equal to male
students.
Implementing article I of this Charter will likely limit Division I
men's programs at most schools to football and basketball. Under
current NCAA rules (with the additional limitation described below in
article IV of this Charter), this will mean that schools will offer the
equivalent of sixty-eight full scholarships to male athletes. Under
article II, each school would operate a sufficient number of women's
sports to provide an equivalent number of athletic scholarships to
female student-athletes. Schools would presumably consider climate,
geography, recruiting base, tradition, rivalries, and other factors in
selecting the sports most suited for their own institutional needs and
aspirations.42
41. A scheme where the president would propose such a list creates too much of a
risk that the president would simply suggest unattractive alternatives. The report should be
signed by each dean and director (or dissents noted). Thus, deans hoping to be seriously
considered for promotion (as deans of more prestigious colleges or as provosts) would have
an incentive to produce the best academic alternatives possible.
42. Although a full examination of the legal issues relating to the Charter's
conformance to Title IX is beyond the scope of this space-limited symposium contribution, it
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To illustrate, a program that sponsored women's teams in
basketball, volleyball, soccer, softball, and swimming would, under
current NCAA rules, provide athletic-based aid in the equivalent of
sixty-seven scholarships, which would comply with article II. If, due
to fan support, donations, or outside sponsorship, additional men's
sports were offered at the Division I level, then additional women's
Division I sports would also have to be offered.43 Because Principle #3
concludes that the social transformational benefits of equal
opportunity are an independent social benefit of Division I women's
sports, these sports need not be necessarily financed from revenues
generated by men's athletic programs, although universities may, if
they choose, forgo Division I men's sports that would be selfsustaining if they do not wish to use other funds to support women's
sports.
It is true that one effect of this radical reform is to change the
nature of intercollegiate athletic conferences radically. Typically,
intercollegiate athletics features multisport competition against the
same rivals in the same athletic conference. Although enough schools
may opt for the same women's sports to permit continued play against
rivals who also play football and men's basketball (most likely in
women's basketball; certainly likely in Big Ten and Pac-12 volleyball
is unlikely that the Charter would be successfully challenged by female athletes, whose sports
would be reduced (albeit to a lesser degree than male sports). Courts give great deference to
interpretive rulings of the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR). Kelley v.
Bd. of Trs., 35 E3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994). OCR's policy interpretation concludes that an
otherwise nondiscriminatory program complies with Title IX when "proportionately equal
amounts of financial assistance (scholarship aid) are available to men's and women's athletic
programs." Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45
C.ER. pt. 86). The Policy Interpreation continues that a university complies where
"intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments." Id. at 71,418.
Modifying article II to reflect enrollments that are not equal would appear to satisfy this
proposal.
In the final analysis, parsing the Policy Interpetation may be unnecessary: if the
NCAA really adopted a radical reform, it is likely the Secretary of Education would be
specifically invited to determine whether the Charter complied with Title IX, and any
determination would likely be upheld by the courts.
43. NCAA rules do not require schools to fully fund sponsored sports; the
scholarship numbers are maxima, not minima. However, Principle #3's argument in favor of
equal opportunity is in some ways a modification of the more general claim in Principle #1
that general university funds should not be spent on Division I-level intercollegiate athletics.
Therefore, the general principle of prudent management leads to the conclusion that schools
should not offer multiple, underfunded women's sports. Such an offering involves more costs
to the university (particularly coaching and travel costs) than if the university were to offer
sixty-eight scholarship equivalents in fully funded sports.
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and Pac-12 and SEC softball), in other cases universities will need to
organize sport-specific conferences. However, this development
would simply expand traditional practices in several sports."
Article II also requires substantially equal funding and support
for club and Division I-level offerings at traditional Division I
schools. Although operating without the benefit of athletic financial
aid, this means that schools must provide substantially equal coaching
and travel opportunities for men's and women's sports operating at that
level.
Article HI NCAA member schools can offer othersports on an equal
basis to male and female students, limted to financial aid only for
financial need or academic merit, with sinficant restrictions on
coachigandtravel
The effect of implementing articles I and II will mean that most
sports at current Division I schools will operate at the equivalent of an
elite club or Division III level: no athletic scholarships, limited
coaching, and limited travel. The result will be significant financial
savings for universities, with a far less adverse impact on the overall
experience received by affected student-athletes. Indeed, operating
noncommercial sports with minimal spectator interest in this manner is
far more consistent with the NCAA's stated ideals than the status quo.
Following implementation, senior university administrators can apply
their traditional budget allocation discretion to determine whether to
spend the substantial sum of saved funds on expanded, cost-justified
opportunities for intercollegiate athletic participation at this reducedcost level or for more traditional classroom opportunities.
Initially, the NCAA sought to promote the ideas of amateurismthat students should participate in intercollegiate athletics for the
physical, mental, and social benefits-by barring aid based on athletic
ability.45 Use of athletic scholarships began as many schools did not
abide by the so-called "Sanity Code."'
At the time, athletic scholarships became a significant means for
social mobility. Working class and poor kids with athletic talent could
44. For example, the University of Wisconsin and the University of Michigan are
both members of the Big 10 Conference, but their men's hockey teams play in the Western
Collegiate Hockey Association and the Central Collegiate Hockey Association, respectively.
Mark Viera, Donation WilAllow Penn State To FieldDivision I Hockey Teams, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2010, at D4.
45. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Centuy DefenderofAmatewism
orAntitrustRecidivist, 86 OR. L. REv. 329, 333 (2007).
46.
WatPaceFootball.TIME, Jan. 23, 1950, at 47.
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escape poverty or the mills or mines by getting a football scholarship.47
Ironically, Title IX's requirement that schools increase scholarship
offerings for female student-athletes actually led to an increase in
scholarship offerings for male student-athletes as well.
Unlike the 1950s, however, today there is a wide array of needbased financial aid available to students whose families cannot support
the costs of higher education. Indeed, many top programs recruit
student-athletes almost exclusively from participants in traveling club
teams that provide training and elite competitive opportunities that are
simply unavailable to poor and working-class families who cannot
afford the many fees and expenses associated with this level of youth
competition.48
Travel is perhaps the prime example of the point set forth in
Principle #1 that the vastly higher costs of Division I athletics are not
cost-justified for most sports in light of the similar physical, mental,
and social benefits derived from participation in club or Division III
athletics. What public interest is served by having the Seton Hall
tennis team fly to Milwaukee to play Big East rival Marquette?
Moreover, breaking the tie between receipt of financial aid and
athletics participation will allow students to choose for themselves
when athletics, as an integral part of their college education, is worth
pursuing. Division I athletes may currently feel compelled to continue
at their "job" despite a preference to focus more on studies. This
compulsion may be justified as an essential way to ensure stability of a
multimillion-dollar operation: when a young man commits to play
football for Penn State or the University of Alabama (Alabama), many
others rely on that decision. Such an exception to principles of
amateurism has no equivalent justification for Seton Hall tennis.
Article IV All Division I sports scholarshipsmay be allocatedon an
equivalency basis (each sport is allocateda designatednumber of fiul
scholarsp equivalents, which may be awarded to student-athletes as
full or partialscholarships); the designated number for football is
reducedfrom eighty-five to filly-five.
47. 144 CONG. REc. 6289 (1998) (claiming college athletics is one of the few ways
out for children in poor urban areas); see also ALL THE RIGHT MOVEs (Lucille Ball
Productions, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1983) (depicting Tom Cruise playing a
high school senior from a working class Pennsylvania town consigned to work in steel mills
in lieu of dreams of an architecture career unless football scholarship comes through).
48. Joseph Blackburn, The Financial Cost of Playing AAU Travel Baseball, or Its
Equivalent (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (estimating cost to parents for
player aged ten to eighteen in excess of $7500 per year).

2012]

RADICAL REFORM OFA THLETICS

953

The foundational principle that major college football programs
should be prudently managed applies both to unilateral management
decisions at individual universities and to collective management
decisions made by the NCAA and the major football conferences.
Because the principal purposes of universities are teaching, research,
and service, college presidents legitimately forgo profit-maximizing
strategies for college football that conflict with noncommercial
educational goals. Otherwise, prudent management requires that
universities seek to maximize commercial revenue and minimize
expenses so that the maximum amount of surplus funds are generated
for other worthy goals. Permitting Division I football programs to
offer eighty-five scholarships to eighty-five athletes is not prudent
management: significant costs savings would accrue by reducing the
total number of scholarships to fifty-five, and by permitting partial
scholarships, the sport is likely to become modestly more popular, thus
increasing overall revenues.
As a thought experiment, consider an alternate universe where
the elite college football competition was organized by an independent
commercial entity (like, for example, the way in which the National
Association of Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) organizes stock car
racing). This entity would design the competition to provide a level of
quality that would result in the most cost-effective combination of high
revenues with low costs.49 One important aspect of this design would
be rules that limit expenditures that were unlikely to be recouped in
increased revenues across the sport. This is particularly true where
there is a "high discriminatory power" to a sporting contest: where a
competitor who spends just a bit more than a rival substantially
increases its probability of success.so In lay terms, a prudent organizer
seeks to restrain wasteful expenditures that contribute little to the
overall popularity of the sport but that each participant must spend lest
they fall behind.
To illustrate, consider a variety of highly detailed and technical
engineering rules that NASCAR has adopted to limit particular kinds
of innovative additions to the race car. Racing teams have an incentive
to spend considerable sums to permit their cars to race a few seconds
faster per lap. Although NASCAR fans will not notice the difference,
each team is compelled to join this "rat race." Prudent management
49. Economists call this inquiry "contest theory." For an application of contest theory
sports competitions, see Stefan Szymanski, The Economic Design of Sporting Contests,41 J.
ECON. LiTERATURE 1137, 1140-46 (2003).
50. Id at 1142-45, 1173.
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bars these wasteful expenditures and channels teams' incentives into
expenditures, creating features that will actually maintain or increase
fan appeal." NASCAR rules are thus designed to achieve "parity,
safety, and cost" savings.2 The first two goals maximize fan appeal,
and the latter goal maximizes profits with an optimal revenue stream.
Because college presidents legitimately may prefer noncommercial goods to profit-maximization, universities might actually want
to encourage expenditures that are not necessary to maximize fan
appeal in order to serve educational purposes, such as tutoring and
counseling services for student-athletes.
In similar fashion,
universities might forgo revenue-maximizing opportunities, such as
Thursday night football, because of the disruption to campus life that
such events cause." However, absent specific noncommercial goals, it
is imprudent for university leaders to fail to implement fully the
NCAA Bylaw on prudent management by permitting their football
teams to engage in expenditures that are not reasonably necessary to
maintain or increase revenues. And when, as is often the case, no
single team can cut its own imprudent expenditures, collective action
is required. Cost savings from reducing the number of football
scholarships to fifty-five will result in seven-figure savings to most
institutions.54
Moreover, the reduction in the number of scholarships and the
ability to offer partial scholarships will likely alter the distribution of
playing talent among member schools in a manner likely to make
college football more attractive and therefore increase overall
revenues. In addition, article IV serves an important noncommercial
51. An oral legend at Penn State involved wasted expenditures surrounding the
recruiting of Western Pennsylvania star athlete Terelle Pryor. In order to demonstrate Penn
State's continuing interest, Defensive Coordinator Tom Bradley drove over two hours to
Jeannette High School to watch Pryor play basketball. Not to be outdone, an Ohio State
booster, noticing Bradley prominently sitting in the crowd, phoned Columbus, and an Ohio
State assistant coach was dispatched on a private jet to fly to the game so he too could be in
attendance.
52. ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE NASCAR WAY: THE BusINEss THAT DRIvEs THE
SPORT 35 (1998).
53. See Viera, supr note 14.
54. The typical full scholarship has a yearly value of $15,000 for in-state public
schools, $25,000 for out-of-state public schools, and $35,000 for private schools. NCAA,
How Do ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS WORK? (2011), availableathttp://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/19481c00474f41 1daed6ee07lelceb2b/BBDHowScholarWork.pdfMOD-AJPERE
S&CACHEIID-19481c00474f41ldaed6ee07lelceb2b. Because athletic budgets would save
on sixty scholarships (because the reduction from eighty-five to fifty-five in men's football
would result, under the principles of this Charter, in a similar reduction of thirty scholarships
in women's sports), the savings totals would range from around $1 million for a public school
relying almost entirely on in-state student-athletes to over $2 million for private schools.

2012]1

RADICAL REFORM OFA TIfLETICS

955

goal of facilitating a more informed decision by a prospective studentathlete in selecting the college of his choice.
Although a reduction in compensation for services rendered will
often result in fewer talented people offering their services, this
phenomena is unlikely to occur in college football. Top stars are going
to receive full scholarships (indeed, article V, below, proposes the
option of modest cash supplements to a full scholarship), financially
needy players can supplement their athletic aid with a Pell Grant or
other need-based support, and others are not going to forgo
intercollegiate athletic competition and a chance (however remote) that
their talent might blossom to pursue a professional football career
because they are only receiving a partial scholarship." Thus, the
reduction in overall expenditures on college football players is not
likely to result in a noticeable reduction in the overall quality of college
football.
Article IV will, however, affect the allocation of players among
teams. In functioning markets, human as well as tangible assets go
where they are most highly valued. In sports, stars often go to weaker
teams, where their contributions are likely to make a bigger difference
to the team's success." This is particularly true of younger talent,
whose long-term professional prospects are usually better served by
more playing time for a lesser team than warming the bench for a
dominant team. Currently, however, this process does not function in
Division I football, where at top schools all football players receive the
same full athletic scholarship.
Some observers have suggested that a modest version of this
phenomena occurred between 1992 to 1994 when Division I rules
reduced the number of football scholarships from ninety-two to eightyfive. Players of a given modest ability, who might previously have
received one of the last scholarship offers at dominant school, accepted

55. The interest in noncompensated participation in Division I football is sufficiently
high that current NCAA rules bar more than twenty nonscholarship football players from
"walking on" a team. SeeNCAA BYLAWS art. 17.9.2.1.2 (2011).
56. See, e.g., Jack Curry, Wetteland Closes, but Ith with Texas, N.Y.TIMEs, Dec. 16,
1996, at C1; Kevin Lonnquist, Signed Sealed Delivered; Yankees MVP ReliefPitcherTeams
up with Rangersfor Four Years, $23 Million, ARLINGTON MORNING NEWS, Dec. 17, 1996, at

Al (discussing how pitcher John Wetteland saved all four World Series victories for the 1996
New York Yankees but was not given a serious offer because the Yankees also had Mariano
Rivera; instead Wetteland signed with Texas, which had a terrible bullpen). One study
showed that free agency tended to lead to a move of pitchers from better to worse teams.
Stephen F. Ross & Robert B. Lucke, Why Highly PaidAthletes Deserve More Antitrust
Protectionthan Ordinary Unionized Workers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 641, 655-56 (1997).
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scholarships at less dominant programs. The result was a narrowing of
the gap between the elite and very good teams."
Under article IV coaches of top programs could not offer a full
scholarship to all desired players. Consider two star high school
running backs, five-star prospect Andy Alpha and four-star prospect
Bobby Beta. Assuming coaches shared the assessment of recruiting
evaluators, Alabama Coach Nick Saban or University of Oregon
Coach Chip Kelley would be likely to offer a full scholarship to Alpha,
being able to afford only a partial scholarship to Beta, as Alpha is the
most likely star. Incoming Washington State University (Washington
State) Coach Mike Leach or University of Mississippi Coach Hugh
Freeze, however, might offer Beta a full ride because of great
confidence that Beta would start for the Cougars or the Rebels.
Because the likely effect of this redistribution of talent is from the
dominant schools in Division I Bowl Championship Series (BCS)
conferences to the other schools in these major conferences, article IV
will likely result in a greater distribution of top talent across more
Division I football squads, resulting in greater competitive balance.
The economic literature is famously mixed in analyzing empirical
evidence that competitive balance in major professional sports
increases fan appeal." There are logical grounds to believe, however,
that increased balance among the teams in the major college football
conferences will indeed increase fan appeal, as measured by
attendance and television ratings. First, because top schools play at
capacity and lesser schools do not," increased balance will result in
greater attendance: Indiana University will attract more fans, and
people who lust for returned glory will not give up their season tickets
57. See William C. Rhoden, NCA.A. CutsPractice,Scholarshisand Seasons,; N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/10/sports/ncaa-cutspractice-scholarships-and-seasons.html?pagewanted=all&src-pm.
58. Szymanski, supranote 49, at 1153-55.
59. To illustrate, the legendary programs at Penn State and Ohio State saw average
home crowds from 2001-10 of 106,439 and 104,750, respectively. In contrast, Illinois
(averaging 4.7 wins per season during the decade) attracted an average live gate of 52,673,
while Indiana (averaging 4.1 wins per season), attracted an average live gate of 34,983. This
data has been aggregated from several sources. The NCAA provides data at NCAA Football
Attendance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/stats/football/
attendance/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). Additional data for Illinois can be found at
UNIV. OF ILL., THE RECORD BOOK 111-12 (2011), available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/
schools/ill/sports/m-footbl/auto-pdf/2011-12/miscnon_event/201 1_FBRecordBook5_v2.pdf.
Additional data for Indiana can be found at Football Archives, INDIANA HOOSIERS,

http://iuhoosiers.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/archive/ind-m-footbl-archive.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2012), and at History, INDIANA HOOSIERS, http://iuhoosiers.cstv.com/auto pdf/p-hotos/
s chools/ind/sports/m-footbl/auto-pdf/06expftblhist (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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at the Michigan Stadium. In Division I football, the distribution of
hard-core fans is widespread, and more casual fans are keen to see top
matchups, regardless of who they are. Thus, local ratings for the
improved teams will increase, avid fans of dominant powers will keep
watching, and national television ratings will be relatively unaffected,
in contrast to MLB, which sees a drop in ratings if the playoffs feature
smaller market teams.60
The lack of empirical support for the claim that fans prefer more
balanced competitions is superficially puzzling. Sports economics is
premised on the theory that a unique attraction of sports is outcome
uncertainty." Increased imbalance makes it more likely that the
outcome of individual games are more certain, the outcome of the
season-long competition is even more certain, and the likelihood that
doormats become champions and dominant teams become doormats is
nonexistent. So why is evidence so weak relating to a positive relation
between competitive balance and fan appeal in leagues like the Major
European soccer leagues and MLB? And why would college football
be different?
One problem with the empirical evidence is that some sports
economists, who began their study with a focus on baseball, conflated
the outcome-uncertainty concept with competitive balance. Until the
introduction of the three-division/wildcard concept in 1995, MLB
teams that did not win their league or division championship had
nothing to play for; season-long outcome uncertainty evaporated early
on for many teams. Moreover, because of the need to fill stadia for
eighty-one games, there is reason to suspect that overall attendance
might actually be higher with teams like the New York Yankees and the
Boston Red Sox always in contention and the Pittsburgh Pirates and
Kansas City Royals never in contention than a regime of parity.
The closest sport to college football (large nationwide audience,
few games that often sell out) is the National Football League (NFL),
which features significant parity among teams. This reasoning
suggests that article IV not only saves millions of dollars in
expenditures, but it eliminates expenditures that are truly "wasteful,"
because the cost savings will result in greater, not reduced, revenue.

TBS' LCS Audience Down 44% with Smaller Markets, NFL Pnmetime
60.
Competition,SPORTS Bus. DAILY, Oct. 18, 2011, availableathttp://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/Daily/Issues/2011/10/18/Media/MILB-ratings.aspx.
61.
The concept was first expressed in the economic literature in Walter C. Neale,
The PeculiarEconomics ofProfessionalSports, 78 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1964).
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Moreover, article IV increases revenues while at the same time
serving an important goal of allowing student-athletes to make more
informed decisions about the college of their choice. Highly recruited
high school football players are not alone in selecting a college that
will best further their professional aspirations. My current employer,
Penn State, widely advertises that it is the number one choice among
corporate recruiters.6
The current system of offering all football players a full
scholarship creates a significant information asymmetry. Although
coaches can truthfully tell Andy Alpha, Bobby Beta, and Gary Gamma
that they each have a chance to start if they work hard and excel,
competitive elite players tend to overestimate their own ability, and
coaches have a much better sense of potential talent than an eighteenyear-old. When Washington State Coach Leach pleads with Beta to
don the crimson and gray and start for the Cougars instead of standing
on the sidelines for the cardinal and gold of the University of Southern
California (USC), it is likely to fall on deaf ears. This is why the
distribution of top recruits is skewed to a small handful of teams.63
Article IV will provide high school athletes with valuable
information. Leach's claim that Beta is likely to start for Washington
State and unlikely to start for USC will likely be validated when Trojan
Coach Lane Kiffin offers a full ride to Alpha and a half-scholarship to
Beta. Beta is, of course, free to prefer a top program.' But that choice
is an informed one, not one based on misinformation.
Article V Individual awards can range from one-quarter of the full
cost of education to a sum including a full scholarshipplus a cash
subsidy to elite athletes not to exceed one-halfof the averagefull cost
62.
Wall Street JournalRanks Penn State No.1 Among CorporateRecruiters,PENN
ST. U. (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.research.psu.edu/news/2010/wsj-ranking; see also Teri
Evans, Penn State, TexasA&M Top the List WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2010, at Bl.
63. Among the schools with the top-ranked 2011 recruiting classes, see Recruiting
Database, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-sports/football/recruiting/database (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012), 13 of 14 "5-star" recruits and 167 of 287 "4-star" recruits went to the top 15
programs. There was skewing even within this elite group: Florida State attracted 1 "5-star"
recruit, 17 "4-star" recruits, and 7 "3-star" recruits; under a star-point ranking system, the
11th-ranked class, Oklahoma, had no "5-star" recruits, 9 "4-star" recruits, and 8 "3-star"
recruits. See Class of 2011 Team Football Recruiting Rankings, ESPN, http://insider.
espn.go.com/college-football/recruiting/classrankings?classyear-201 1&action-login&appRe
direct-http%3a%2f/o2fimsider.espn.go.com%2fcollege-football%2frecruiting%2fclassrank
ings%3fclassyear/o3d201 1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
64. For example, NFL Pro Bowl quarterback Matt Cassel was a backup quarterback
at USC to Carson Palmer and then Matt Leinart. See Matt CasselProfile,USCTROJANS.COM,
http://www.usctrojans.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/casselmatt00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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ofeducation at DivisionI universitdes; compliance would be facilitated
by strict auditing of top players, NCAA adoption of standardlaw
enforcement techniques,and stiFpenaltiesfor all violatots.
For over a century, critics of college football have bemoaned
widespread cheating by university officials or supporters who have
paid athletes in contravention of the rules of college sport in order to
permit their university to gain a competitive advantage." For over a
century, these critics have warned that the crises du jour, unlike all past
crises, represent the demise of college football. History suggests,
however, that American college football fans have not, and will not in
the foreseeable future, lose their century-plus fascination with the
sport, despite the recurring scandals.
Article V is therefore not proposed as an essential ingredient to
save college football. Although reforms such as those advocated in
articles I, II, and IV may well become fiscally inevitable, article V
realistically serves a more modest goal of reducing the unnecessary
costs of scandals.
Scandals involving improper payment to student-athletes impose
significant costs on stakeholders: member schools must pay for costly
NCAA investigations, penalized schools suffer lost revenues,
university officials caught violating rules lose their jobs, etc." The
scandals are symptomatic of a deeper problem: there are strong
incentives for third parties to cheat and a widespread view that such
cheating is socially acceptable because student-athletes are
economically exploited. Article V addresses this problem.
The current incentives for those involved in big-time college
sports significantly distort efforts to achieve a prudently managed
sport run in a manner consistent with public policy. Like baseball
owners before the Black Sox scandal led to the creation of the office of
Commissioner of Baseball, the decision makers in the member-run
NCAA have conflicting incentives: rules designed to maximize fan
appeal; promote integrity; and serve well-articulated noncommercial,
educational goals need to be strictly enforced, but no one wants harsh
penalties imposed on their own institution. Would-be agents and
others weigh the future benefits of developing good relationships with
college students with significant potential for professional success
65.

See RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY:

A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE

ATHLETIC REFORM (2011).

66. A costly example recently involved recruiting violations and dismissal of Indiana
basketball coach Kelvin Sampson. See Colombo, supm note 12, at 153 n. 186.
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against the minimal penalties that they will suffer if it is revealed that
they have conspired with student-athletes to break NCAA rules.
Boosters seek personal glory among confidantes and personal access
to star athletes, commodities purchased by under-the-table-cash-ladenhandshakes; again, the risks to the boosters are minimal under current
enforcement schemes. Student-athletes, whose status as professionalsin-training often leaves them with a lifestyle below that of many of
their fellow students, seek immediate financial benefits to themselves
and family members from the benefits that under-the-table payments
can secure.
Implementation of article V will minimize the extent of economic
exploitation of those student-athletes whose services in a free market
would be valued at more than the cost of a full scholarship.
Economists recognize that a professional athlete's economic value is
the marginal revenue a club earns as a result of the player's
performance, compared to the revenue that would be earned if the club
were forced to employ the next likely alternative player. Baseball
"sabermetricians" have developed a statistic using this foundational
concept: Value Over Replacement Player (VORP)." In a free market,
a Division I starting football player's value is the difference between
his ability to contribute to wins and that of the alternative (either the
second-string player on the same team or a starter at a lower-achieving
school), measured by the likely effect of that variation on team success
and the likely effect of team success on revenue. So measured, there
are relatively few players whose own abilities are likely to exceed the
value of their replacement by $25,000-$40,000, the sum of a current
full athletic scholarship."
But even if there are relativelyfew players, among the scholarship
recipients who are economically exploited at the most successful
programs, this can still total a lot of individual players.

67. Rob Neyer, The World According to VORP, ESPN INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2007),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/hotstove06/columns/story?columnist-neyer _rob&id=2751842.
68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Studies estimating a significantly
greater degree of exploitation often ignore the competitive dynamic of a free labor market. A
starting point guard for a good basketball program might well generate over $200,000 in
revenue. However, competition from other potential point guards can drive down his free
market salary considerably. In a competitive market, a team would rather pay $40,000 to a
less-talented player whose contributions will generate $190,000 in revenue than pay $200,000
to a top point guard whose contributions will generate $220,000 in revenue. Moreover,
because top college football and basketball programs feature sold-out arenas and long-term
television deals, the additional revenue that a star player can bring in, even if he takes the
team to the national championship, is not likely to be that great.
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The perception of exploitation would be significantly limited if
NCAA rules permitted a cash payment, that today might approximate
$15,000, on top of a full educational scholarship. Virtually any player
at an elite school whose "fair market value" exceeded the full cost of
education could surely attract a "Full Plus" scholarship at some
Division I school. Cheating is likely to be less tolerated if under-thetable money is going to an athlete who is receiving as much as
$15,000, or who could have chosen to attend a school where he had
such an offer but voluntary chose instead to accept a lower financial
aid package at his current institution. To be sure, many stakeholders'
incentives to cheat would not be affected by article V The principle
claim is that others will find this behavior less tolerable, and thus
support stricter enforcement mechanisms.
A more complex but perhaps less costly alternative would be to
retain the maximum aid at the full cost of education but to end the
collective NCAA policy barring schools from competing for players
by allowing them to exploit their image and publicity rights
economically." Under this alternative, the NCAA could pattern its
practices after those of the NFL and its players association, allowing
players to exploit image rights and sharing in the economic benefits of
collective image rights. To the extent that players' earnings would
exceed a level necessary to maintain a clear line of demarcation
between professional and collegiate sports,"o the funds could be placed
into a trust fund for the student-athlete's use after the expiration of
intercollegiate eligibility."
Seizing on an increased consensus that the rules are fair, article V
proposes sensible and strict enforcement mechanisms. First, as with
baseball (learned in the Black Sox scandal), enforcement needs to be
independent of member schools' governance, through the creation of
an NCAA Inspector General, a leading law enforcement official who,
like the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would serve a
single ten-year term. Second, the Inspector General would be given
adequate resources not only to investigate complaints but to audit both
players and their families and close friends.72
69. Insofar as the NCAA policy requires players to perpetually forfeit their image
rights, even after graduation, it is the subject of current antitrust litigation. See, eg.,
O'Bannon v. NCAA, 2010-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 76,899 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
70. See infla text accompanying notes 147-149.
71.
My thanks to Brian Barcaro for this idea.
72. See Raynell Brown, Stephen Ross & S. Douglas Webster, Exploiting Kids: The
Scandal in Agent Recruiting of Athletically-Gifted Teens 24 (May 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://law.psu.edu/_file/Sports%2OLaw/o20Policy%20and%20
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Third, because under-the-table payments are "victimless"
consensual crimes, they need to be detected and prosecuted like
similar offenses, such as drug distribution, insider stock trading, or
price fixing. Typical detection schemes for these crimes include stiff
penalties for those caught, generous amnesty for those who come
forward to target others, and a general priority of targeting the more
culpable. If student-athletes caught receiving funds were allowed total
or near-total amnesty if they provided evidence sufficient to target
boosters and would-be agents, this would significantly reorient the
incentives of those who cheat.
Fourth, stiff penalties need to be applied, particularly to the
boosters, agents, and others providing unapproved financial
supplements to a player's financial aid package. One attractive option
that NCAA member schools can employ under existing law is
aggressive use of civil litigation, suing violators for intentional
interference with contractual relations. This well-accepted tort can
also provide universities with punitive damages." Federal law and
many state statutes prohibit agents or others from providing items of
value to student-athletes or their families in a manner that would result
in rendering the athlete ineligible for continued college sports.74 Some
of these statutes provide their own remedies." In addition, many states
permit tort recovery for institutions damaged by a third party's
violation of statutory law."

Research%20Institute/ExploitingKidsjthe Scandalin AgentRecruiting-ofAthleticallyGiftedTeens.pdf. Like other law enforcement officials targeting a suspect in a criminal
investigation, the ability to get information from third parties is limited. Here, an
independent arbitral panel should be given the power to revoke the eligibility of a studentathlete if appropriate in the circumstances where there is reason to believe that a family
member or friend may have received things of value due to the player's athletic skill, and they
will not submit to an audit. In addition, third parties may have an incentive to cooperate to
avoid liability if exposed later.
73. John A. Gray, Sports Agenth LiabihityAlterSPARTA?, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
141, 141-49 (2006).
74. See, e.g., Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7807
(2006); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2051.35 1(a)(14) (West 2011) (finding that an athlete agent
may not "commit an act or cause a person to commit an act on the athlete agent's behalf that
causes an athlete to violate a rule of the national association for the promotion and regulation
of intercollegiate athletics of which the athlete's institution of higher education is a member").
75. E.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2051.551(a) (permitting "[an institution of higher
education adversely affected by an athlete agent's ... violation of this chapter" to file a suit
for damages).
76. Id.; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 18897.6 (West 2011) ("No athlete agent or athlete
agent's representative or employee shall, directly or indirectly, offer or provide money or any
other thing of benefit or value to a student athlete.").
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Another basis for penalizing those who would provide college
athletes or their families with under-the-table payments would be to
prosecute them criminally for conspiracy to defraud universities. In
order to receive financial aid, college athletes must sign a statement
certifying that they have not received any improper financial or
tangible items of value." Most agents and boosters are aware of these
rules, and so providing under-the-table payments reflects an agreement
between the payor and the athlete to permit the athlete to continue to
draw financial aid from the university under false pretenses. In United
States v Walters, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit rejected the use of the federal mail fraud statute' to prosecute
an agent who had provided significant cash, loans, and a backdated
contract for agent representation. However, the court reasoned that
the federal statute required proof that the accused had profited from a
scheme to defraud; otherwise, as the court observed, someone who
uses a telephone or the mail to play a practical joke on a friend would
violate the law." However, the government could prosecute an agent or
booster, consistent with Walters, by alleging that the actual fraud was
committed by the athlete, and the agent/booster was the coconspirator,
rather than the principal, and abetted the athlete's effort to keep gifts
and an athletic scholarship.
With regard to agents, a final means of stricter enforcement
would be to persuade the players' unions, particularly in football and
basketball, to impose harsher penalties on agents who have provided
improper payments. Indeed, both the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) and the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA) have rules that clearly outlaw the payment of anything of
value to an athlete to secure their business, even after the athlete is a
professional." Players associations do have understandable concerns
that their members not be deprived of the agent of their choice. In the
short run, a multiyear suspension of an agent caught violating these
rules would deprive existing professionals of their desired agent.
77.

See NCAA, 2011-12 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE 11-13

(2011), availableathttp//www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA.pdf (describing the
requirements to be considered a NCAA amateur athlete).
78.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
79. 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
80. Id.at 1224.
81.

NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS

§ 3(B)(2)

(2007),

reprntedinPAUL C. WELER ET AL., DOCUMENTS AND STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT TO SPORTS AND

THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 222 (4th ed. 2011); see George Cohen, Ethics andthe
RepresentationofProfessionalAthletes,4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 156 (1993).
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However, in the long run, strict penalties that lessen under-the-table
payments enhance the unions' desire to facilitate a free and wellinformed selection of advisors whose talents are critically important to
an athlete's career. Often, scandals come to light because the player
realizes that the agent most willing to provide under-the-table cash is
not the best agent to negotiate a contract.82 Countless other athletes,
though, may have remained with sleazy agents for fear of exposure,
instead of being free to select the agent of their choice. These athletes
would be better served by stricter penalties by the players associations.
In sum, article V proposes a combination of increased financial
assistance for the elite stars whose contributions result in significant
revenues for their colleges, with tough enforcement of revised rules to
minimize the likelihood of continued cheating. This combination is
fairer to athletes and to schools and facilitates means to avoid
embarrassing scandals.
IV. THE CHARTER OF REFORM AND ANTITRUST LAW
The prior discussion set forth five reform proposals
implementing four foundational principles that anchor sound public
policy with regard to intercollegiate athletics. The claim here is not
that federal antitrust law mandates any of the reforms." Rather, this
Part discusses why NCAA member schools' adoption of the Charter of
Reform would not violate the Sherman Act. After a discussion of
general principles, this Part focuses on four specific aspects of the
Charter that may draw the attention of those seeking to use antitrust
laws to block reforms that they oppose.
A.

GenemlAnttrustPrhvciplesApplicableto NCAA Rules

Three general principles anchor any antitrust analysis of NCAA
rules. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that antitrust
laws apply only to commercial restraints imposed by NCAA member
institutions. Second, the Court applies a "rule of reason" in analyzing
82. For descriptions of scandals coming to light when improper payments came to
light when an agent was no longer representing the athlete with whom he had conspired to
violate NCAA rules, see, for example, Jack Cavanaugh, UMass and UConn Lose '96
Honors,N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1997, at B21 (regarding former UMass Minuteman Marcus
Camby and former UConn Huskies Kirk King and Ricky Moore), and Lynn Zinser, US.C
Receives Haush Penaltiesfrom NC.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B9 (regarding former
USC Trojans Reggie Bush and O.J. Mayo).
83. The thesis is that these NCAA rules should be changed on policy grounds. A full
analysis of current NCAA rules is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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commercial restraints, which focuses on the quantity and quality of
output and price. Third, courts use a three-step analysis in applying
this rule of reason. To be found unreasonable, a commercial restraint
must have a demonstrable anticompetitive effect and either lack a
legitimate justification or be found unnecessary to achieve the
defendants' legitimate goals.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits conspiracies in restraint
of trade.84 The principal purpose of this section is to prevent economic
entities from agreeing among themselves to reduce competition in
order to increase their profits." The fact that the economic entity is a
not-for-profit institution does not fundamentally change the analysis
where it appears that the entity is motivated by a desire for increased
revenues or profits. Thus, in NCAA v Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to
an agreement that significantly limited the number of college football
games that could be broadcast each Saturday; the Court's reasoning
was not markedly different from the likely decision regarding a similar
agreement among professional teams." The Court properly rejected
Justice White's dissenting argument that the NCAA's nonprofit
orientation warranted significant deviation from standard antitrust
analysis; in regard to this particular restraint, it would be hard to
imagine how university presidents would act any differently if they
were seeking purely to maximize profits. Significantly, the Sherman
Act does not permit firms, regardless of structure, to reduce output or
raise price because the resulting monopoly profits will be used for
worthy causes."
In contrast, courts have rejected antitrust scrutiny of NCAA rules
that are designed for noncommercial ends. This implements longstanding Supreme Court precedent that recognizes the possibility for
differential analysis of agreements reflecting nonprofit entities'
noncommercial goals." Thus, in Smith v NCAA, the United States
84.
85.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).

86.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRuST POLICY:
THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 214-15 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that antitrust law scrutinizes
joint activity because it involves private actors seeking private gains and trade-restraining
conduct reduces output lower than, and raises prices higher than, competition would
produce).
87. Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of the Exclusive Collective Sale of Intellectual
PropertyRightsbySportsLeagues,3 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 52, 76-77 (2001).
88. While rejecting a claim that professional services did not constitute "trade" for
antitrust purposes, the Supreme Court expressly noted in Goldfarb v Vrginia State Barthat
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered a challenge to an
NCAA rule that limited eligibility to undergraduate students, with a
limited exception for students doing graduate work at the same
institution where they competed as undergraduates." The court
determined that NCAA rules establishing academic standards for
student-athletes and defining amateurism are not subject to review
under antitrust law because they "are not related to the NCAA's
commercial or business activities," and because they "allow for the
survival of the product, amateur sports, and allow for an even playing

field."

90

Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear that sporting
competitions require some agreement among the member schools, so
that rules that might be blatantly illegal in other contexts will be
considered carefully under a rule of reason." The "hallmark" of an
agreement constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade is that
"[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and
both are unresponsive to consumer preference." The Court observed
that many NCAA rules would be sustained against antitrust challenge,
because they make college sports more attractive by differentiating the
product from its athletic equivalent of minor league professional
sports, thus increasing output and making output responsive to
consumer preference."
Finally, courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a
restraint is reasonable. First, the plaintiff must show an actual restraint
on competition: evidence that the restriction has affected price or the
quantity or quality of output. Second, the defendant may justify a
restraint by showing that its purpose is legitimate and procompetitive.
the fact that restraint operates in something other than a classic business is relevant to
determining that the practice violates the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
89. 139 E3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacatedon othergrounds,525 U.S. 459 (1999).
90. Id at 185, 187.
91. Justice Stevens authored both decisions so holding. He first wrote in Board of
Regents that "a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that [the
NCAA] and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved." 468 U.S. at 117. He
repeated the claim in Amnencan Needle, Inc. v NFL. 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010) (stating
that NFL teams "must cooperate in the production and scheduling of games"). Although the
procompetitive benefits of cooperation among professional sports clubs or colleges otherwise
in competition justifies the application of the rule of reason, Justice Stevens is, with all
respect, simply incorrect that this cooperation is essential for a sporting competition to exist.
For example, the regulations agreed to by rival professional sports clubs or the NCAA
member schools are determined in auto racing by an independent entity, NASCAR. PAuL C.
WELER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 549-51 (4th ed. 2011).
92. Bd ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 107.
93. Id at 101-02.
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Third, the plaintiff can rebut this showing by demonstrating that the
actual restraint is overly restrictive and not reasonably necessary.'
Although there is broad language in some antitrust precedents that
suggests that sports restraints are subject to some gestaltbalancing of
harms and benefits," there are no reported cases where a court has
struck down a restraint shown to be reasonably necessary to achieve a
legitimate procompetitive purpose.
B.

SpecificAntitrustLhitationon the NCAA: Rules Can Only
Limt Members'Participationmi Sports UnderNCAA
JuIrisdction

The NCAA sponsors and regulates a wide number of
intercollegiate athletic sporting competitions. The NCAA Bylaws
contain a wide variety of rules that regulate these competitions. By
their own terms, NCAA Bylaws only govern NCAA-sponsored
competitions. The NCAA Constitution expressly provides that the
Bylaws govern "all teams in sports recognized by the member
institution as varsity intercollegiate sports."' If an institution does not
award "varsity letters" or other traditional amateur indicia of "varsity"
sports, the sport does not have to fall within the NCAA's jurisdiction.
To illustrate, Brigham Young University (BYU) does not have a
NCAA men's soccer team, choosing instead to participate in the
Premier Development League, a semiprofessional league for players
under the age of twenty-three. Although BYU players are not paid,"
providing payment would not affect the status of BYU as a member of
the NCAA participating in other sports. Or, at the other extreme, the
California Institute of Technology competes in some sports as a
member of NCAA's Division ill but has sponsored a football team that
includes faculty and graduate students and competes against

94. Law v. NCAA, 134 E3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
95. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 E2d 1249, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1982)
("[The] inquiry [is] 'whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition'. . . ."(quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)); Chi. Bd. of Trade v United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.").
96. NCAA CONST. art. 3.2.4.5 (2011).
97. See Final Game of the Season, BYU MEN'S SOCCER (July 20, 2011), http://
byusoccer.com/blog/2011/07/final-game-of-the-season/.
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community colleges, military football teams, and others outside the
NCAA framework."
Under a proper interpretation of current NCAA rules, member
institutions are free to sponsor sports teams outside NCAA jurisdiction
and not classify them as "varsity sports." As the Supreme Court has
recognized, the NCAA seeks to market a particular type of athletic
competition, differentiated from and much more popular than minor
league professional sports, based on the NCAA's "fundamental policy"
that seeks to "retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports."" Today, many NCAA member
institutions offer club sports that are not subject to NCAA rules.
Likewise, if NCAA member institutions wished to offer
semiprofessional sporting competitions, they too should simply fall
outside the NCAA rubric. To illustrate, MLB could enter into an
agreement with Southeastern Conference (SEC) schools to withdraw
from NCAA baseball and to participate in their own competition,
subsidized by MLB, which would allow professional clubs to pay
students to attend school while playing baseball. As long as the sport
was not characterized as "varsity" and SEC schools did not play
regular-season matches against other NCAA schools, the current rules
permit such an agreement. In similar fashion, universities that did not
share the Charter's antagonism toward diverting scarce resources from
history teaching assistants or chemistry labs to subsidize nonsustaining
intercollegiate athletics could form their own competition, either in
football or other traditional nonrevenue sports.
A strong case can be made, however, that NCAA members would
violate the Sherman Act if they adopted rule changes, or if the NCAA
were to adopt a strained interpretation of existing rules, to bar schools
from participating in NCAA-sponsored competitions if they chose to
sponsor non-NCAA sports separately at an elite level. NCAA
members did act in this unlawful manner in the early 1980s, prior to
the successful antitrust challenge to NCAA restraints on college
football broadcasts.'" At that time, members with major football
programs had formed the College Football Association (CFA) and,
when the CFA considered sponsoring its own football program outside
the jurisdiction of the NCAA, the NCAA informed members that they
would be ineligible to participate in otherNCAA-sponsored sports if
98.

Richard Demak, They Field Tough Eggheads in Caltech Football, SPORTS

ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 31, 1987, at 8.
99. NCAA CoNST. art. 1.3.1.

100. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984).
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they followed that course."o' The matter was never independently
litigated, because the CFA members were happy to return to the
NCAA fold once the Supreme Court struck down the disputed
television restraints.
The Board of Regents litigation highlighted a problem that has
seriously affected NCAA governance, where the vast majority of
schools operating sports on a noncommercial basis were voting on
legislation that only affected the relative minority of schools operating
sports that generate substantial commercial revenues.102 Current
NCAA governance procedures allow greater leeway for Division I
schools to set their own rules appropriate to their own situation.'3 The
most plausible way to implement this Charter of Reform is for it to be
adopted with the support of a majority of universities currently
competing at the top level of intercollegiate sports (currently called the
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision). If a minority of elite athletic
programs prefer to operate in a different manner, the Sherman Act
ought to constrain the ability of the majority to force their unwilling
compliance by refusing to allow them to participate in other sporting
competitions where the minority is in full compliance with NCAA
rules. Allowing those who do not wish to operate under the Charter of
Reform to try to form their own competitions outside the NCAA
rubric makes it far easier for the Charter of Reform to withstand
antitrust scrutiny.
C

The Agreement To OperteExpensive DivisionI Sports Only
Where Revenues Match Expenses or Where Necessary To
Comply with Title IX

Implementing the Charter will transform most men's Division I
sports programs, and many women's Division I programs, from
expensive, subsidized programs featuring athletic scholarships,
extensive coaching, and significant travel, to reduced programs that are
the equivalent of elite club or Division III sports. Clearly, stakeholders
directly affiliated with these affected sports (athletes, parents, and
coaches) will strongly oppose this policy initiative and would likely
seek to prevent its implementation by claiming that the Charter
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
101. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F Supp. 1276, 1324-25 (WD.
Okla. 1982), affdihpar4 remandedinpart,707 F2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'4 468 U.S.
85 (1984).
102. SeeBd. ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 118.
103. NCAACONsT., supra note 4, § 4.01.1.
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Sherman Act. Specifically, the Charter could be challenged as
reflecting two allegedly distinct anticompetitive agreements: (1) an
agreement among member schools that operate self-sustaining sports
programs not to compete against those who are not self-sustaining;1
and (2) an agreement among schools not to operate sports that are not
self-sustaining.'o5 Parsing the particular agreements demonstrates that
these agreements are either reasonable restraints of trade or
noncommercial in nature.
Under the rule of reason, the initial question is whether the
restraint affects price or output. The Charter likely will have such an
effect, although in a very atypical way. The relevant market in which
trade is allegedly restrained is characterized by a high degree of
product differentiation (most fans differentiate college football from
the NFL, and many fans are particularly avid supporters of particular
college football programs).'06 Output will be reduced to the extent that
certain differentiated products, for which there is insufficient
consumer preference to generate revenues equal to cost, will no longer
be available (or at least will not be available in competition with other
Division I programs, which is what avid fans of these programs
This output effect is quite different from a typical
prefer).
anticompetitive output reduction, where the effect of a restraint is to
reduce the defendants' output, resulting in an increase in the price for
the defendants' services, and allowing the defendants to achieve
greaterprofits than would be available in a competitive market. Nor
does the agreement exclude more efficient rivals, allowing the
defendants to provide services unresponsive to the preferences of the
defendants' consumers. Rather, with minimal direct impact on their
own ability to generate surplus revenues over expenses, or the price or
quality of output for their consumers, programs like Penn State, the
University of Texas, Alabama, and USC will have adopted an
agreement that reduces output from schools like Rutgers

104. This will likely occur primarily in football and basketball and among a small and
elite number of programs still able to offer Division I ice hockey, baseball, and wrestling.
105. The Charter could also be challenged as an agreement among self-sustaining
programs not to spend in excess of revenues. Because the hallmark of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is the creation of competitive markets responsive to consumer preference, it is difficult to
see how competition is restrained when firms do not behave in economically irrational ways
to provide goods or services that consumers will not commercially support. In any event, the
analysis in the text would suffice for this challenge as well.
106. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02; Heather Gibson, Cynthia Willming &
Andrew Holdnak, "We're Gators ... Not JustGatorFans"-Serious Leisure and University of
FloridaFootball,34 . LEISURE REs. 397 (2002).
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University"'-output that will unlikely have an impact on nationally
televised games appealing to most football fans and will only have an
impact on live gate and regionally televised games appealing to the
relatively small number of avid fans of these schools who are
insufficient in number to generate revenues necessary to be selfsustaining. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the
agreement does not have an anticompetitive effect at all.
In nonsports contexts, a joint venture's decision to exclude others
is not normally seen as a restraint of trade. Others are free to form
their own joint venture."' (Likewise, anyone would be free, after the
NCAA implements the Charter, to join and play in the "Subsidized
Football Conference.") Where a plaintiff can demonstrate that the joint
venture is an "essential facility" to which access must be granted,"' the
focus of competitive concern is not with the rights of the plaintiff, nor
the rights of consumers avidly loyal to the plaintiff's differentiated
product, but on the defendant's ability to generate monopoly profits or
to gain a commercially unfair advantage from the exclusion."o In the
market for college football, it is unlikely that the exclusion of football
or basketball programs that were not self-sustaining would have any
significant effect on the ability of the remaining teams to raise prices
for tickets, television rights, licensing, or sponsorships, nor would the
defendants' output be reduced. The only output excluded is from
those who, for noncommercial reasons, desire to lose money to
participate in an otherwise successful commercial venture. Therefore,
a court should conclude that the Charter's requirement that
107. Curtis Eichelberger, RutgersBig Ten DecisionMay Put School SportsPrograms
Deeper in Debt, BLOOMBERG (June 8, 2010, 2:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-06-08/rutgers-big-ten-decision-may-put-school-s-sports-programs-deeper-in-debt.html
(stating that almost half of Rutgers University's athletic department's $58.5 million dollars
were from state subsidies and student fees). Another report suggested that Connecticut,
Syracuse University, Wake Forest University, and Duke University all lost money on their
football programs. Brett McMurphy, For Longhorns, Money Grows on FootballProgram
Instead of Trees, AOL NEWS (June 30, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/06/
30/for-longhorns-money-grows-on-football-program-instead-of-trees/.
108. H.R. REP. No. 98-1044, at 9 (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
109. This is a highly controversial topic. See HOvENKAMP, supod note 85, at 309
(calling the doctrine "troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable").
110. Two sports cases invoking the doctrine are illustrative. In Fishrnan v Estate of
Witz, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant owner of the Chicago-area arena best suited
for professional basketball violated the antitrust law by refusing to execute a lease, thus
allowing a related firm to win the competition for an NBA franchise. 807 F.2d 520, 525,
535-38 (7th Cir. 1986). In Hecht v Pro-Football,Inc., the plaintiff challenged a contract term
between the operator of Robert E Kennedy Memorial Stadium in Washington and the NFL
Redskins club barring a lease with another football team. 570 F.2d 982, 985-86 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
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participation in Division I men's sports be conditioned on revenues
exceeding expenses over a multiyear period does not constitute a
restraint of trade in a commercial context.
An even stronger argument, however, is that the restraint is
noncommercial. The Charter does not exclude efficient rivals or new
entry, as commercial restraints would. Immediately upon implementation of article I, Fordham University (a Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision (I-AA) school) could announce a partnership with the
New York Yankees to play in Yankee Stadium and broadcast games on
the Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network, with a three-year plan
designed to turn the Rams into New York's premier college football
program. Nor does the Charter exclude inefficient rivals from
competing if they can receive sport-specific donations. Even if other
revenue was insufficient to keep Oklahoma State in the black, the
Cowboys could continue to compete in Division I as long as oil baron
T. Boone Pickens was footing the bill."'
The only practice effectively precluded by article I is the use of
funds that would otherwise go to educational purposes from being
spent on expensive Division I athletic programs. As outlined above,
the NCAA should ban this practice not because of commercial
considerations, but rather the very specific noncommercial concern
that university presidents and trustees are too likely to be "captured"
by special interests who desire an entertainment product that the
market will not support. No profit-maximizing enterprise would take
this action. There is no direct economic benefit resulting from a
lessening of competition in the market in which the targeted firms
operate." 2 Rather, the net effect of the policy is to promote a wider
consumer choice in the broader educational market.
In this regard, the court of appeals decision in United States v
Brown University is instructive."' Unlike the agreement limiting
Division I men's sports to self-supporting operations, the Third Circuit
observed that an agreement among elite academic schools to limit
scholarships to those based on financial need would be consistent with
the parties' economic self-interest in revenue maximization.
Nonetheless, the court remanded for a more detailed rule of reason
I11. Jenni Carlson, OSUMegaboosterBoone PickensRidmg as High as His Cowboys
Are Ranked NEWSOK (Oct. 26, 2011), http://newsok.com/osu-megabooster-boone-pickensriding-as-high-as-his-cowboys-are-ranked/article/3617230 (reporting Pickens's donations to the
Oklahoma State University's athletic department to be valued at $300 million).
112. lB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 177 (3d ed. 2006).

113. 5 F3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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analysis, observing the need for special care in predicting the
economic consequences of a restraint when defendants claim that it
was motivated by "'public service or ethical norms."' 4 Specifically,
the court observed that an agreement to allocate financial aid solely on
the basis of demonstrated need meant that available resources are
spread among more needy students, increasing the number of students
able to afford an education at an expensive elite private school."' In a
similar fashion, an agreement to allocate educational resources solely
to nonathletic educational programs, or to athletic programs tailored
primarily for the benefit of the student-athlete (Division III or clublevel competition), means that scarce resources are available for
financial aid or educational quality improvements."'
The purposes of the Sherman Act are furthered when rivals
compete for consumers' patronage by putting forth choices that
provide consumers with their preferred mix of price, output, and
quality."' Organizing a competition based on principles of prudent
financial management serves these goals. It is more likely that
universities will make investments in commercialized football and
basketball designed to respond to consumer preferences if their rivals
are also making similar investments than if rivals are participating in
Indeed, the
sporting competitions for alternative motivations.
distortive effect of subsidies motivated by outside concerns has been
recognized by other competition law regimes. For example, the United
Kingdom Monopolies and Merger Commission (Commission)
blocked the acquisition of Manchester United by News Corporation,
the owner of the Sky Sports (Sky) satellite network, in part because the
Commission found that the team would be operated principally to
promote the value of programming on Sky rather than prudently as a
soccer team."'
The flip side of article I can be characterized as an agreement
among NCAA schools not to offer revenue-losing programs at the
Division I level. It is true that this aspect of article I is output114. Id. at 672 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349
(1982)).
115. Id.at 675.
116. Although antitrust defendants cannot justify anticompetitive commercial
arrangements resulting in increased profits with arguments that they further noneconomic
social values, courts should consider the degree to which noncommercial decisions further
social as well as procompetitive values. Id.at 675 n. 10.
117. Neil W Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "ConsumerChoice"Approach to
AntitrustLaw, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 175 (2007).
118. BSkyB Bid for Man Utd 'icked Out,'BBC NEWS BusINESs: THE COMPANY
FILE (Mar. 17, 1999, 11:48 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/298072.stm.
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reducing, to the extent that programs attract a live attendance and, in
some cases, a television audience, even if revenues from these sources
are insufficient to cover costs. But the purpose and effect of the
agreement is not to permit the "conspirators" to raise price or increase
profits; rather, it serves the noncommercial goal of limiting athletic
subsidies from funds that can be used for educational purposes.
An agreement not to offer revenue-losing programs might also be
characterized as an anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the
broader market to obtain the best students to matriculate at the
university and the best professors to accept offers to join the faculty.
With regard to football and men's basketball, it may be true in some
few cases that the benefits to the school from increased enrollment or
faculty retention outweigh the costs of the annual subsidy. For these
programs, however, the money-losing university's agreement is not the
cause of the injury; rather, it is the procompetitive decision of the selfsustaining schools that effectively excludes those whose fan base is
insufficient. With regard to other sports, it seems fanciful to claim that
the reduced quality of nonrevenue sports, which do not attract
significant audiences anyway, will affect nonathletes' desire to attend
the school. Moreover, if State University wants to attract Hannah
Highscore because of her phenomenal SAT results, they are free to
award her a merit scholarship not based on athletics, and she can play
sports for them.
D.

The Agreement To OperateSpots Subsidized by Genera
UniversityFunds Only on a Club orDivisionHILevel

Article III restricts most sports programs that are not sustainable
to competitions featuring no athletic-based scholarship, limited
coaching, and restricted travel. In analyzing an antitrust challenge to
an agreement among NCAA members to implement this agreement,
its precise scope bears emphasis. If a minority of NCAA member
schools wish to form the Subsidized Sports Association, and compete
outside the NCAA umbrella in competitions with like-minded
institutions anxious to divert educational funds to intercollegiate
athletics participation that is not cost-justified, they would be free to do
so.
Antitrust law focuses on restraints on competition in relevant
economic markets."' There is no relevant economic market for soccer
or golf at the Division I level. Any reduction in the quality of play is
119. HovENKAMp, supo note 85, at 92.

2012]

RADICAL REFORM OFA THLE TICS

975

irrelevant because there are virtually no "consumers" of high quality
play.
A bit more analysis is required to dispose of a claim that
universities are restraining competition in the market for student
enrollment. This is a relevant market, although the unique nonprofit
motivation of schools is highly relevant to the antitrust analysis. Thus,
the Third Circuit remanded for more detailed analysis a district court
order barring a cartel agreement among the Ivy League schools and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to agree on how much needbased financial aid to award to students.'20 The case was eventually
settled, allowing the colleges to agree among themselves not to
compete for students by offering merit-based scholarships. 2 ' The
universities argued that limiting competition in this way and
collectively channeling resources to need-based aid actually increased
opportunities to attend elite schools and therefore increased demand
for the "product" of elite higher education. 2 2 If Harvard University
and Yale University can agree not to compete for students by offering
them merit-based scholarships, then it would seem to follow that Penn
State and Ohio State University can agree not to compete for students
by offering them athletics-based scholarships. Like the Ivies, Big Ten
schools can also increase demand and opportunity by channeling those
funds into other programs. Indeed, to the extent that tuition-paying
students are attracted to an institution by the opportunity to participate
in intercollegiate sports, universities can use the savings from Division
I nonrevenue sports to expand their offering of club sports.
Moreover, limiting club sports, as outlined above, is a legitimate
way to maximize the noneconomic goals of intercollegiate athletic
competition. Competitive balance and a fair opportunity to compete
are served when teams are playing with a level playing field. Federal
courts have upheld restrictions on "minor" competitions precisely to
allow them to compete. 23 Finally, it is not clear how a court could
distinguish the limits advocated by article III of the Charter from
existing limits in Division I. Division I schools already agree to limit
financial aid to levels that, at least for elite students, are far below what
they would receive in an unrestrained market; article III lowers the
120. Brown Univ, 5 E3d at 661,679.
121. William H. Honan, MI T Wins Rikht To Share FinancialAid Data in Antitrust
Accord N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, at Al 3.
122. Brown Univ, 5 E3d at 674-75.
123. See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 E2d 973 (1st Cir.
1984).
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level of aid (students participating in these sports could not receive
tuition waivers or cash for housing, food, and books, but could
continue to receive tutoring and health services); Division I schools
limit the number of coaches each team can have, while article III
simply lessens the number further. It is difficult to see how article III's
additional limits on travel has any anticompetitive effect in any real
market.
This discussion would not be complete without an analysis of
Law v NCAA.' 24 That case involved an NCAA rule permitting
Division I men's basketball teams to hire three assistant coaches and
then changed the rule to require one of these assistants to be a
"restricted earnings" coach whose salary could not exceed $16,000 per
year.'25 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck
down the salary limit. There are many ways in which the holding on
the NCAA's restricted earnings rule is distinguishable from article IV
of the Charter, revealing why the latter is likely to be found lawful.
First, in striking down the assistant coach salary cap, Law
expressly distinguished another circuit opinion in Hennessey v
NCAA, which had upheld a limit on the number of coaches.'26 The
restricted earnings rule was a "naked restriction on price" that
immediately called for the defendants to justify their restraint; a
justification on the number of coaches required an independent
assessment of the reasonableness of the restraint. It is not clear that a
ban on scholarships and restrictions on the number of coaches and the
distance for permitted travel contemplated by the Charter's article IV
even restrains trade in a relevant economic market, because by
definition these teams are not operated on a commercial basis.
Second, Law found that Hennessey had improperly placed the
burden on the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, to show that a clear
restraint of trade is not justifiable.'27 If the Charter's article I (barring
economically unsustainable Division I sports) passes antitrust
muster,'28 then article III merely allows schools that cannot be
commercially profitable in sporting competitions to agree on a
uniform basis of competition against one another, which is a sufficient
justification.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

134 E3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id at 1020.
Id.at 1020-21 (discussing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Id.at 1021.
See supm text accompanying notes 111-118.
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Moreover, unlike the blatant effort to save a few thousand dollars
through a "salary cap" on an assistant coach in Law, article IV's limits
are reasonably necessary to ensure a balanced sporting competition
that will give the maximum number of student-athletes the opportunity
to gain the physical, social, and mental benefits of intercollegiate
athletic participation. Such a justification was inconceivable with
regard to the rule challenged in Law
E

Reducing the Maximum AllowableAthleticAid for Footballand
Allowing PartialScholarship Offers

Distinct issues arise with regard to the proposal that football
squads reduce the maximum athletic aid from eighty-five full
scholarships to the equivalent of fifty-five scholarships, which could
be spread among more student-athletes in the form of partial
scholarships (the process that is currently used for the vast majority of
NCAA sports). Under current precedents, this rule would be
considered a restraint of trade. However, careful analysis shows that
the restraint is acceptable under the rule of reason, as a restraint that is
reasonably necessary to improve competitive balance and thereby
increase overall fan appeal for college football, as well as one that
provides many student-athletes with greater information and facilitates
a more informed choice of college.
An agreement among elite college football programs to reduce
the number of football scholarships is a restraint of trade. Although
one court of appeals incorrectly suggested that the agreement among
schools to limit compensation for college football players to a
scholarship means that there is no relevant economic market,'29 there
clearly would be a relevant economic market if the member schools
had not agreed to limit compensation! Although the proposed limit is
unlikely to limit the number of young men willing to play Division I
football, the compensation provided under article V is clearly less than
what would "otherwise be" absent the agreement. An agreement
among competitors that reduces the price of labor to less than what
would "otherwise be" requires a justification to survive the rule of

reason.1o
129. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1992). The strength of the
court's conclusion is unclear, as the opinion noted that "Banks might possibly have been able
to allege an anti-competitive impact on a relevant market through a more carefully drafted
complaint or an amendment to his complaint." Id. at 1094.
130. Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
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Before turning to the legitimate justifications for this restraint, a
brief discussion is warranted because sports labor cases raise
interesting issues of general antitrust applicability concerning the
ability of firms to justify reducing competition in input markets in
order to improve competition or consumer welfare in output markets.
A buyers' cartel cannot justify its conduct by proof that a portion of the
below-market prices defendants pay for labor or inputs will be passed
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.'' Likewise, no cartel can
justify its behavior on the ground that the lower costs or higher prices
that result allow more firms to stay in business, a justification that
would legalize any anticompetitive scheme.
However, restraints that are reasonably necessary to produce a
better quality or cheaper product are permissible, even where the
restraint adversely affects labor or input markets. The Supreme Court
unequivocally held in Board of Regents that an agreement that
restrained trade in one market (in that case, broadcasting) could be
justified if shown to be reasonably necessary to promote a level of
competitive balance that increases the popularity (and thus output) of a
sporting competition to consumers.'32 In similar fashion, United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in Mackey v NFL that
restraints in the labor market could also be justified if appropriately
tailored to achieve the goal of competitive balance.' A prior decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Smith v Pro Football,Inc." is to the contrary, but it precedes
Board of Regents and was poorly reasoned. In analyzing the
procompetitive benefits of the NFL's rookie draft, Smith held that the
only way that parties can increase competition is by encouraging new
firms to enter the market or allow existing firms to offer a product at a
lower cost.'
This view ignores the possibility that an agreement
allows existing firms to offer a superior product at the same cost,

131. See HOVENKAMP, supm note 85, at 171 (demonstrating erroneous reasoning of
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1989), to
effect that anticompetitive bidding agreement among movie theaters was permissible because
theaters paid less for films). Balmoral Cinema's holding has not been followed by recent
cases, as aptly discussed in John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The FundamentalGoal of
Antitrust: ProtectingConsumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. RE. 191,
235-36 n.213 (2008) (citing Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
2000)); Law, 134 F3d at 1010, 1022-23.
132. 468 U.S. at 102, 117.
133. 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
134. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
135. Id.atl186-87.
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Moreover, a refusal to determine the
thereby increasing output.'
overall effect of a restraint is inconsistent with the general welfare
approach to the rule of reason.'"
Limiting each university to the equivalent of fifty-five
scholarships is the analytical equivalent of a salary cap adopted by
Although these caps are
many professional sports leagues.
widespread, few judicial opinions have considered whether these caps
are reasonable restraints of trade. (They either have gone unchallenged
or are adopted by owners in leagues with a collective bargaining
relationship with a players' union and as such are protected by the socalled "non-statutory labor exemption.")'"
In the professional context, salary caps can harm players by
limiting the compensation they would receive absent the agreement to
cap salaries. They can also harm fans: by preventing high-revenue but
underachieving teams from spending more money to get better talent,
competitive balance can be reduced.'39
The similar limit in college football is justified, however, for two
reasons that are arguably distinct from the professional sports context.
First, as the Supreme Court has explained, college football's popularity
lies in its successful effort to differentiate itself from professional
sports.'4 0 One important way that college football differs from
professional sports is that, unlike woefully disappointing "big market"
clubs like the Toronto Maple Leafs, New York Knicks, or (until 2004)
Boston Red Sox, fans do not want college football programs to
improve by simply increasing payroll.
Second, because of the nature of alumni loyalty as well as
stadium capacity, the case that improved competitive balance would
increase overall output and fan appeal is much more likely in college
sports.141
136. Kirkwood & Lande conclude that buyer-side restrictions without an anticonsumer
effect are an antitrust concern "only where suppliers have been exploited by the
anticompetitive behavior of buyers, and only where consumers would not be forced to pay
supracompetitive prices." Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 131, at 236.
137. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (noting that the Sherman
Antitrust Act is a "consumer welfare prescription").
138. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 956-59 (2d Cir. 1987).
139. This claim is detailed in Stephen E Ross, The NL Labour Dispute and the
Common Law the Competition Act, andPublicPolicy,37 U.B.C. L. REv 343, 384-91 (2004)
and Stephen E Ross, CompetitionLaw andLaborMarkets, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS LAw 311, 311-21 (James A.R. Nafziger & Stephen E Ross eds., 2011).
140. NCAAv. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
141. For a discussion of why restricting football programs to fifty-five equivalency
scholarships would improve competitive balance, see supratext accompanying notes 56-57.
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In evaluating the effect of the scholarship reduction/equivalency
reform on college athletes themselves, two other concerns become
relevant. First, the effect on the student-athletes differs from the effect
of a professional team salary cap in that poor students will be
economically unaffected, because those receiving only a partial
scholarship can supplement their athletic aid with need-based financial
aid. Second, the equivalency feature is procompetitive in the sense that
an important component of competition that the antitrust laws facilitate
is consumer choice about matters beyond quantity and price.'42 As
described in Part III, article IV will require college football coaches to
reveal their superior predictions about those recruited athletes most
likely to start and contribute for their team and those more likely to
remain on the bench. This will help the student-athlete choose the
program and university best suited for his needs. The courts have
explicitly recognized that the rule of reason permits colleges to justify
otherwise anticompetitive agreements that serve to enhance student
choice."'
Increasingthe Maximum AllowingAthleticAid To PenimtCash
Paymentsofup to One-Halfa Typical Scholarshipfor Star
Players
Under article V, coaches could allocate up to one and one-half
scholarships from their existing limit (reduced for football under
article IV from eighty-five to fifty-five) for star players. Because of
the overall scholarship limits, it is likely that even in men's football and
basketball, this "One Plus" scholarship would be awarded only for
extraordinary athletes. There are two potential sources of antitrust
concern with regard to article V Some may worry that providing cash
payments of $15,000 would strip NCAA member schools of the
defense that it needs to limit payments to student-athletes to promote
the distinctiveness of college sports. Another fear is that once cash
payments are authorized, schools could not justify limiting those
payments to the equivalent of one-half of an academic scholarship.
Neither concern need detain implementation of the Charter. Article V
is consistent with the Supreme Court's view that restrictions in college
sports are reasonably necessary to differentiate the product. Limiting
payments to athletes to 150% of the value of a college scholarship can
E

142.
143.
injunction
agreement

Averitt & Lande, supm note 117.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing
barring elite schools from agreeing on scholarship offers in order to effectuate
barring merit scholarships).
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be justified both as necessary for product differentiation as well as to
promote competitive balance.
Lower courts have consistently rejected the argument that the
current limit of a full athletic scholarship constitutes a restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act." The best reasoning, however, comes
in dicta from the Supreme Court:
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college
football. The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as,
for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character
and quality of the "product," athletesmust not bepaid must be required
to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the "product" cannot
be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.
In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only
the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletesand hence can be viewed as procompetitive.145
In contrast, the dissenting opinion by Justice White (joined by Justice
Rehnquist) emphasized the nonprofit and amateurism goals of NCAA
member schools:
The NCAA, in short, "exist[s] primarily to enhance the contribution
made by amateur athletic competition to the process of higher
education as distinguished from realizing maximum return on it as an
entertainment commodity." In pursuing this goal, the organization and
its members seek to provide a public good-a viable system of amateur
athletics-that most likely could not be provided in a perfectly
competitive market.'46
What is notable about Justice Stevens' opinion for the seven-justice
majority is that it provides an entirely commercial justification for
commercialrestraints. That is, the NCAA engages in a commercially
144. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 E2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (failing to allege impact
in a discernible market); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 E2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding
dismissal of complaint for failure to state a claim because complaint did not allege facts
showing that rules did not enhance NCAA's goal of marketing college football distinctly from
professional football).
145. Bd ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 122 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Ass'n for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F Supp. 487, 494 (D.D.C. 1983), affb
735 E2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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successful marketing strategy by offering a commercial entertainment
product, college football, which is vastly more popular than minor
league baseball. Why is college football so much more popular?
According to Justice Stevens, the cause is the NCAA's successful
Because successful product
product differentiation strategy.
differentiation increases demand for (and thus output of) the product,
the antitrust conclusion shall be that agreements reasonably necessary
to promote this successful marketing strategy pass muster under the
rule of reason.
In analyzing article V's authorization to pay elite players a cash
subsidy in excess of the costs of education, it is important to
distinguish two goals that the NCAA articulates for intercollegiate
athletics. One is amateurism.'47 This concept has been extensively
criticized as incoherent or inappropriate for modem times.4 8 Many
philosophical articulations of amateurism are inconsistent with the
current Division I practice of providing athletic scholarships. In any
event, those who believe on philosophical or policy grounds that
paying cash to student-athletes is a bad idea are not going to support
article V The other goal is to "maintain[] a clear line of demarcation
between [inter]colleg[iate] athletics and professional sports."l49
Considering the affluence of a significant number of college students
today, a cash payment of $15,000 is not going to permit a star player to
enjoy a lifestyle that will be significantly distinct from the upper
quintile of the student body at most universities that feature top
football programs. As such, it is unlikely to erode the product
differentiation between college football and minor league football, and
thus it can be adopted without jeopardizing the remainder of NCAA
rules.
The very same justification-product differentiation with
professional sports-means that setting a limit on cash subsidy at
approximately $15,000 is reasonably necessary to maintain that
differentiation. If wealthy teams could pay unlimited sums to college
147. NCAA CONsT. art. 2.9 (2011).
148. For a detailed critique of the notion that the purpose or effect of NCAA limits on
compensation is to ensure that student-athletes are, consistent with the NCAA's stated ideals,
primarily motivated by education and the physical and mental benefits of athletics
participation, see ORIARD, supra note 17, at 197-224. See also Kenneth L. Shropshire,
Legislation for the Glory ofSport: Amateunism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
7, 9-18 (1991) (tracing historical development of the myth of Greek amateur ideals through
elite British schools into American collegiate athletics).
149. NCAA CONST. art. 1.3.1. This is the goal recognized in Board ofRegents as a
legitimate justification under the rule of reason. See supranote 91 and accompanying text.
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students, there is a significant risk that college sports could not attract
the same degree of popularity (especially for those teams paying huge
sums and not winning on the field).
To be sure, a star athlete might allege that, absent the restraint of
trade inherent in article V, he might have received $25,000 in cash; he
might further allege that such a payment would not be viewed by fans
as significantly different than $15,000, and therefore the NCAA
cannot justify the one plus half scholarship limit. Antitrust defendants
are not subject to liability for failing to adopt a rule that is precisely the
very least restrictive policy. The Supreme Court has noted that a
restraint is reasonable, under the rule of reason, if it does not exceed
"the limits reasonablynecessaryto meet the competitive problems."'
As the Third Circuit has noted, plaintiffs cannot succeed in an antitrust
challenge to a business practice whenever "the imaginations of lawyers
[might] conjure up some method of achieving the business purpose in
question that would result in a somewhat lesser restriction of trade.""'
Other jurisdictions have helpfully articulated this doctrine in their
countries as requiring an antitrust challenger to present a "counterfactual" that is a "commercially reasonable alternative."'52 Although an
antitrust plaintiff need not prove the existence of a less restrictive
alternative beyond any reasonable doubt, some benefit of the doubt
should be extended where sporting organizations can claim that a
practice is coherent and nonpretextual, and reflects a good faith
concern that less restrictive alternatives would injure their business
enterprise."
150. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967) (emphasis
added). The wording dates back to the path-marking decision by Judge William Howard Taft
in United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 E 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'4 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
151. Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 E2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975).
152. Rugby Union Players'Ass'nv. Commerce Comm'n (No. 2), [1997] 3 NZLR 301,
320-21 (HC (Commercial List)).
153. In contrast to the legitimate concerns that NCAA schools may have that cash
payments significantly higher than one-half the value of a scholarship would impair their
effort to maintain a clear differentiation with professional sports, consider the Rozelle Rule
successfully challenged in Mackey v NFL, 543 E2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Although the NFL
claimed that promoting competitive balance was the purpose of the rule giving the
Commissioner the authority to require appropriate "compensation" when a team signed a
player previously employed by another club, it is clear that the Commissioner's exercise of his
authority bore no relation to competitive balance. The most notable example introduced into
the trial evidence concerned a Pro Bowl tight end signed by the expansion New Orleans
Saints (who then had outstanding quarterback Archie Manning and little else) from the
playoff-bound San Francisco 49ers. The 49ers were awarded two first round draft picks,
whom they used to select a future Pro Bowl center and a future Pro Bowl tight end. This
award could not possibly be understood to promote competitive balance. Rather, the scheme
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In the past, NCAA rules have not been particularly solicitous of
the goal of maintaining competitive balance in sports. As the Supreme
Court noted in rejecting competitive balance as a justification for
severe restrictions on output for televised games, there was no
evidence that the restraint was "even arguably tailored" to promote
competitive balance.'54 Moreover, as Northwestern University alumnus
John Paul Stevens had the opportunity to note, the current level of
imbalance in college football did not suggest that the restraint had any
success.1'
However, unlike the television restraint successfully challenged in
Board ofRegents, a limitation on the amount of cash supplements for
individual players would promote competitive balance. As described
above,"' limiting the amount of compensation to the equivalent of
fifty-five scholarships will have the effect of allocating players among
teams in a more equal manner, which is likely to increase attendance
and ratings for the weaker schools far more than it will harm
attendance and ratings for traditionally dominant schools. Likewise,
strict rules preventing wealthy and successful football programs, or
their boosters, from supplementing this compensation, will further this
goal of greater competitive balance in college sports.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current NCAA rules and practices of member schools result in
widespread and unjustified cross-subsidization of funds from football
and basketball surpluses, from economically exploited star athletes
whose efforts lead to significant revenue streams, and from funds that
would otherwise be available for enhanced teaching and research. The
Charter of Reform would eliminate this wasteful spending and
facilitate a fairer allocation of resources, as well as tougher
enforcement against under-the-table payments.
As with any serious reform proposal in a complex society, there
are winners and losers from implementation of the proposal. Those
adversely affected include many student-athletes who will lose
scholarships awarded without regard to financial aid, assistant coaches
in sports that are not economically self-sustaining, spectators seeking
more persuasively revealed a league policy that sacrificed some degree of competitive
balance (improving the Saints at the expense of the superior 49ers) in order to maintain the
nonlegitimate goal of holding down player salaries.
154. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
155. Id.atll8n.62.
156. See supm text accompanying notes 56-57.
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to have others subsidize big-time sports at their favorite university
where revenues are insufficient to support expenses commercially, and
coaches who benefit from their ability to lure less sophisticated high
school recruits unlikely to star at their university, when with better
information the athlete might select a less-successful program where
he has a greater opportunity to play.
The challenge toward implementation is that other beneficiaries
(except a handful of elite athletes receiving a "one plus" scholarship)
are far more dispersed."' These include football players who make a
better-informed decision on where their talents are likely to be most
valued, avid fans of less-successful teams and general fans who
welcome greater competitive balance in Division I football, and those
able to participate in potentially increased offerings of elite club-level
sports at major universities. The greatest number of beneficiaries,
however, are students and faculty who are likely to see an increase in
funding for the principal missions of a university (teaching and
research), as commercially successful institutions like Penn State and
Texas provide additional millions of support from football and
basketball surpluses to additional faculty, teaching assistants, and
research grants, while less successful institutions like Rutgers no
longer take funds from educational missions in order to subsidize
nonsustainable athletic programs.

157. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 33-37 (1965)
(describing generally how it is relatively easy for pressure groups to form to obtain
significant benefits for a few and relatively difficult for pressure groups to form to obtain
small benefits for many). The existing literature is nicely summarized in WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 51-54 (4th ed. 2007).

